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1. THE GENEVA COLLOQUIUM ON CONSOLIDATION 
AND THIS REPORT
1.1 The Geneva colloquium on consolidation
This is the fi nal report on the colloquium entitled, Consolidation of Proceedings 
in Investment Arbitration: How Can Multiple Proceedings Arising from the Same 
or Related Situations Be Handled Effi ciently?, which was held on April 22, 2006 
in Geneva. The colloquium was co-organized by the Project on International 
Courts and Tribunals (PICT) and the private and public international law 
departments of the Geneva University School of Law. It brought together over 
40 experts from all fi elds of international dispute settlement and all regions of 
the world.1 A number of Ph.D. students, representing the future generation of 
scholars and practitioners, also participated in the event. 
The initiative for the colloquium started from the observation that, 
increasingly, the same event or measure is likely to give rise to claims by 
multiple investors against the same State. Argentina’s fi nancial crisis is the 
foremost recent illustration of this phenomenon. So far, the crisis has generated 
37 ICSID arbitrations. All these proceedings have certain issues in common, 
both on jurisdiction and on the merits, but they are all dealt with separately. 
The Argentine situation is not unique. Similar situations may well arise again 
tomorrow in other countries. Present developments in Bolivia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela inevitably come to mind.
Certain international dispute settlement mechanisms provide for 
consolidation of proceedings that have a common question of fact or law. The 
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a prominent example. Could 
consolidation be introduced more generally for investment arbitrations, whether 
they are conducted under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of other States (ICSID Convention) 
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or under other rules? Is consolidation at all desirable? If it is, how can it be 
implemented: by way of treaties or otherwise? What should the requirements for 
consolidation be? What purposes does it serve? How does consolidation improve 
effi ciency in terms of costs and time? How does it help avoid contradictory 
results? Who should rule on consolidation? What form should consolidation 
take? Can it be partial? Does consolidation raise diffi culties with respect to the 
consensual nature of arbitration, to confi dentiality or to the constitution of the 
tribunal that will deal with the consolidated case? Are there other mechanisms 
that can achieve the same goals?
These were the main questions addressed at the colloquium. The 
colloquium focused on investment arbitration, but drew from the practice of 
other international tribunals, commercial arbitration and national courts. 
1.2 This report
This report is a revised version of a preliminary report prepared by the 
Geneva University team to provide speakers, moderators and participants with 
the background information needed for the colloquium. It integrates fi ndings 
and considerations from the colloquium. 
The report begins by reviewing the instruments currently available to 
deal with situations involving more than two parties in civil procedure as 
well as in commercial and investment arbitration (2 below). It then focuses 
on consolidation, discussing fi rst the arguments for and against it (3 below). 
Thereafter, the report seeks to establish the requirements that must be met 
for consolidation to be ordered, as established in commercial and investment 
arbitration (4 below). It then reviews the methods for implementing consolidation 
in the fi elds of international commercial and investment arbitration (5 below). 
Finally, the report examines the consolidation practice of other international 
dispute settlement mechanisms, specifi cally the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (6 
below), before reaching some conclusions (7 below).
The term “consolidation” can be understood in different ways.2 For purposes 
of this report, consolidation is defi ned as the joinder of two or more proceedings 
that already are pending before different courts or arbitral tribunals. This report 
focuses on consolidation of proceedings pending before arbitral tribunals in 
investment disputes. It is limited to situations in which a host state faces claims 
2 B. Hanotiau, Complex arbitration, Multiparty, Multicontract, Multi-issue and Class Actions 
(2005), p. 179.
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from a number of investors.3 This situation must be distinguished from one 
in which several investors—for example, a local special vehicle company and 
its foreign shareholders—together commence an arbitration against the host 
state.
Building on this report, a working group led by the Geneva University team 
that co-organized the colloquium will draft practice guidelines on consolidation 
for consideration by states, arbitral institutions and potential parties.
Annexed to this report are two of the papers delivered at the colloquium, as 
well as a selection of texts on consolidation and the keynote address delivered 
by Judge Thomas Buergenthal of the ICJ at the dinner on the eve of the 
Colloquium.
2. EXISTING INSTRUMENTS TO HANDLE MULTIPLE 
PROCEEDINGS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE, COMMERCIAL AND 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
The purpose of this chapter is to review different instruments of civil 
procedure, commercial arbitration and investment law intended to handle 
multiple proceedings. Such a review will allow a better assessment of the place 
and function of consolidation and may provide inspiration when seeking ways 
to improve the effi ciency of the resolution of multiple disputes brought under 
investment treaties. 
Certain instruments address situations involving two or more proceedings 
between the same parties. This applies to res judicata and lis pendens (2.1), as 
well as to “fork-in-the-road” and waiver provisions (2.2). These instruments are 
of interest because they show a general tendency to avoid multiple proceedings. 
As they involve the same parties, however, they are of lesser signifi cance when 
it comes to designing an effective consolidation mechanism. Thus, they will 
be reviewed only briefl y. Other instruments involve the concentration of 
proceedings with different parties and, therefore, are closer to our topic. This 
is the case with the rule of connexity (2.3), to some extent the joinder of third 
parties (2.4), class actions and class arbitrations (2.5), the creation of special 
tribunals (2.6), and de facto consolidation (2.7). Still other instruments, in part, 
may achieve the same objectives as consolidation. This may apply to state-to-
state arbitration (2.8) and to the publication of decisions (2.9), which both may 
reduce the risk of inconsistent decisions.
3 The reverse situation, i.e., one investor who has claims against several host states is conceivable, but 
much less likely to occur, and thus will not be considered.
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Some instruments are based on a rule of international or national law, such 
as res judicata and lis pendens. Others are treaty-based—for instance, the fork-in-
the-road, the waiver of an alternative forum and the creation of a special tribunal. 
Still others are based on the parties’ agreement—for instance, the joinder of third 
parties provided in institutional arbitration rules chosen by the parties—while 
others have no basis other than the practice adopted by certain arbitral institutions, 
like the constitution of identical tribunals for different arbitration proceedings. 
Some instruments may have different bases depending on the setting in which 
they come up. This is particularly true of consolidation, which may be based on 
a treaty, national law, the parties’ agreement or institutional rules.
2.1 Res judicata and lis pendens
The principle of res judicata, which can be considered a general principle of 
law in the meaning of Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ,4 implies that a 
dispute cannot be adjudicated twice. It bars re-adjudication, provided there is 
identity of facts, cause of action and parties.5
Like court judgments, it is generally accepted that arbitral awards have a res 
judicata effect. In addition to many other sources, Article III of the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(NYC) provides for such an effect. 
Lis pendens is the corollary of res judicata in a situation where both 
proceedings are still pending.6 It applies whenever two proceedings meeting the 
same identity tests as res judicata are pending before two courts of competent 
jurisdiction. In civil law procedure, a fi rst-in-time rule applies, with the second-
place court having to dismiss or stay the action. In common law procedure, no 
strict rule applies, and the court has discretion to either dismiss the action or 
rule on it.7
4 B. Hanotiau, L’autorité de chose jugée des sentences arbitrales, L’arbitrage complexe, Special Supplement 
Bull. CIArb. ICC 45 (2003), p. 45.
5 Id. p. 46; A. Crivellaro, Consolidation of Arbitral and Court Proceedings in Investment Disputes, 
4 Law & Practice of Int’l Courts and Tribs. 371 (2005), p. 381.
6 On lis pendens in arbitration, see for instance A. Crivellaro, supra note 5, p. 378. See also Geisinger/
Levy, La litispendance dans l’arbitrage commercial international, L’arbitrage complexe, Special Supplement 
Bull. CIArb. ICC (2003), pp. 55 et seq.
7 An example of a rule providing for a lis pendens defense can be found in Art. 27.1 of the Brussels 
Regulation 44/2001 (Brussels Regulation) or Art. 21(1) of the Lugano Convention of Sept. 16, 1988 
(Lugano Convention), which reads as follows:
Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same parties are 
brought in the courts of different Member States, any court other than the court fi rst seized 
shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court 
fi rst seized is established.
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Traditionally, commentators have considered the concept of lis pendens 
as irrelevant to international arbitration. Indeed, international arbitration is 
based on an agreement providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitral 
tribunal. The mere existence of such an agreement was deemed to preclude 
the concurrent exercise of jurisdiction by any judicial or arbitral body other 
than the chosen arbitral tribunal. Challenges to this traditional view have been 
increasing in recent years.8
2.2 Fork-in-the-road and waiver provisions
A fork-in-the-road provision is a clause in a treaty that requires the claimant 
to make an irrevocable choice of forum. It prevents the same dispute from 
arising in different fora.9 The fork-in-the-road clause only comes into play with 
respect to the same dispute between the same parties.10
An example of a fork-in-the-road clause is found in Article 8.2 of the 
Argentina-France Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), which reads as follows:
2. Si le différend n’a pu être réglé dans un délai de six mois à partir du 
moment où il a été soulevé par l’une ou l’autre des Parties concernées, il 
est soumis à la demande de l’investisseur:
• soit aux juridictions nationales de la Partie contractante impliquée 
dans le différend;
• soit à l’arbitrage international, dans les conditions décrites au 
paragraphe 3 ci-dessous.
Une fois qu’un investisseur a soumis le différend soit aux juridictions de la 
Partie contractante concernée, soit à l’arbitrage international, le choix de 
l’une ou de l’autre de ces procédures reste défi nitif.11 
8 The Swiss Supreme Court, for instance, has held that the lis pendens defense applies in arbitration. 
ATF 127 III 279, Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas S.A. v. Colon Container Terminal S.A; See 
Kaufmann-Kohler/Stucki, International Arbitration in Switzerland, A Handbook for Practitioners (2004), 
pp. 30 et seq.. However, a bill is pending in the Swiss Parliament providing that the arbitral tribunal shall 
not stay a proceeding for lis pendens, save in exceptional circumstances.
9 A. Crivellaro, supra note 5, p. 395.
10 Id. 
11 Emphasis added. In the authors’ translation into English, the text reads: 
If the dispute could not be solved within six months from the moment it was raised by either 
concerned Party, it shall be submitted at the investor’s request: 
• either to the national jurisdictions of the Contracting Party involved in the dispute
• or to international arbitration, under the conditions described in paragraph 3 
hereunder.
Once an investor has submitted the dispute either to the jurisdiction of the contracting Party 
involved or to international arbitration, his choice of procedures is considered fi nal.
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The waiver of all alternative fora is similar to the fork-in-the-road clause. 
It seeks to avoid the same problem—the same dispute arising in different fora. 
An example of such a waiver is found in Article 1121(1) of the NAFTA, which 
reads as follows:
A disputing investor may submit a claim under Article 1116 to 
arbitration only if: 
(a) the investor consents to arbitration in accordance with the 
procedures set out in this Agreement; and 
(b) the investor and, where the claim is for loss or damage to an 
interest in an enterprise of another Party that is a juridical 
person that the investor owns or controls directly or indirectly, 
the enterprise, waive their right to initiate or continue before 
any administrative tribunal or court under the law of any Party, 
or other dispute settlement procedures, any proceedings with 
respect to the measure of the disputing Party that is alleged to 
be a breach referred to in Article 1116, except for proceedings 
for injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary relief, not 
involving the payment of damages, before an administrative 
tribunal or court under the law of the disputing Party.12
In this context, one should also mention Article 26 of the ICSID Convention, 
which provides that “unless otherwise stated,” consent to arbitration under the 
Convention is “to the exclusion of any other remedy.” Similarly, Article 27 of 
the ICSID Convention prohibits a Contracting State from giving diplomatic 
protection, or bringing an international claim in connection with a dispute 
“which one of its nationals or another Contracting State shall have consented 
to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under this Convention.”13 
Although different from the NAFTA waiver provision, these rules show the 
intent of the ICSID Convention’s drafters to concentrate the settlement of the 
dispute in a single forum.
12 This instrument is closer to consolidation than the fork-in-the-road clause, because it does not 
focus on the identity of the disputes, but on the State measure from which the dispute arises. See A. 
Crivellaro, supra note 5, p. 397.
13 The prohibition does not apply if the other Contracting State has failed to comply with the 
award.
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2.3 Connexity 
Certain civil procedure rules allow the concentration of related or connected 
disputes in one forum. The foremost example is Article 28 of the Brussels 
Regulation, which provides as follows:
1. Where related actions are pending in the courts of different Member 
States, any court other than the court fi rst seized may stay its 
proceedings.
2. Where these actions are pending at fi rst instance, any court other 
than the court fi rst seized may also, on application of one of the 
parties, decline jurisdiction if the court fi rst seized has jurisdiction 
over the actions in question and its law permits the consolidation 
thereof.14
Accordingly, the court seized of the second (related) dispute may stay the 
action to await and take into consideration the decision of the fi rst court when 
issuing its own decision. The use of the word “may” shows that it can also refuse 
to stay, and rule on the action. It has a third choice—to dismiss the action—
which can then be brought before the court seized of the fi rst dispute. In other 
words, a court faced with a connexity defense has broad discretion, unlike a 
court faced with a lis pendens defense.15
However, when are two disputes related or connected? No strict requirements 
apply; in particular, there is no requirement that the same parties be involved 
in both actions. Whether two disputes are related or connected suffi ciently is 
subject to the court’s assessment.16 In its assessment, the court will take into 
account the defi nition provided in Article 28.3 of the Brussels Regulation, 
which reads as follows:
Actions are deemed to be related where they are so closely connected 
that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the 
risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings.17
14 See also Art. 22.1 and 22.2 of the Lugano Convention. 
15 H. Gaudemet-Tallon, Compétence et exécution des jugements en Europe (2002), p. 277.
16 Id. p. 276; J. Kropholler, Europäisches Zivilprozessrecht: Kommentar zu EuGVO, Lugano-
Übereinkommen und europäischem Vollstreckungstitel (2005), p. 366.
17 See also Art. 22.3 of the Lugano Convention, which uses the same language.
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This defi nition requires that the judgments be intellectually irreconcilable—
for example, one judgment holds that a contract is null and void, while the 
other deems it valid. It does not require that the contradiction be such that the 
judgments cannot both be enforced.18 A good example of a dispute the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) found to meet this defi nition is 
in The Ship Tatry case. In this decision, the ECJ held:
Consequently the term “irreconcilable [...] judgment” there referred to 
must be interpreted by reference to that objective. The objective of the 
third paragraph of Article 22 of the Convention, however, is, as the 
Advocate General noted in his Opinion (paragraph 28), to improve 
coordination of the exercise of judicial functions within the Community 
and to avoid confl icting and contradictory decisions, even where the 
separate enforcement of each of them is not precluded. [...] On a proper 
construction of Article 22 of the Convention, it is suffi cient, in order 
to establish the necessary relationship between, on the one hand, an 
action brought in a Contracting State by one group of cargo owners 
against a ship owner seeking damages for harm caused to part of the 
cargo carried in bulk under separate but identical contracts, and, on 
the other, an action in damages brought in another Contracting State 
against the same ship owner by the owners of another part of the cargo 
shipped under the same conditions and under contracts which are 
separate from but identical to those between the fi rst group and the 
ship owner, that separate trial and judgment would involve the risk of 
confl icting decisions, without necessarily involving the risk of giving 
rise to mutually exclusive legal consequences.19 
Concentration of related but different disputes in one forum is very close 
to consolidation of multiple disputes in investment arbitration. Therefore, the 
defi nition of the Brussels Regulation may be of assistance when designing an 
effective consolidation mechanism.
18 This would for instance be the case if one judgment were to award a painting to one party, while 
the other judgment awards the same painting to another party.
19 Case C-406/92, Judgment of Dec. 12, 1994, the Tatry / Maciej Rataj, paras. 54 and 57. See also 
Case C-39/02, Judgment of Oct. 14, 2004, Mærsk Olie & Gas / Firma M. de Haan en W. de Boer, paras. 
40 and 41.
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2.4 Joinder of third parties 
Contracts involving several parties and containing an arbitration clause are a 
common occurrence in international commerce. One also frequently encounters 
parties linked by multiple contracts. Consequently, it is not surprising that a 
third of all cases submitted to International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 
arbitration in 2002 were multiparty procedures.20 Despite such statistics, most 
national arbitration statutes and many institutional rules take a bipolar view of 
the arbitral procedure.21
Joinder is a process that allows tribunals to add third parties to proceedings 
when the original defendant claims to be jointly liable with a third party or 
simply claims not to be liable due to the fault of a third party. This procedure 
allows tribunals to gather all the relevant parties and to settle all the different 
disputes between these parties.22 
Certain institutional rules provide for the possibility of joining third parties 
to the arbitration. This is, for instance, the case of Article 4 of the Swiss Rules 
of International Arbitration (Swiss Rules),23 Article 22.1.h of the Rules of 
the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA),24 or Rule 25 of the 
International Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC).25 
The joinder mechanism differs from the consolidation procedure addressed in 
20 Whitesell/Silva-Romero, L’arbitrage à pluralité de parties ou de contrats: l’expérience récente de la 
Chambre de commerce internationale, L’arbitrage complexe, Special Supplement Bull. CIArb. ICC 1 (2003), 
p. 7.
21 Y. Derains, Les limites de la convention d’arbitrage dans les contrats impliquant plus de deux parties, 
L’arbitrage complexe, Special Supplement Bull. CIArb. ICC 27 (2003), p. 33. 
22 Woollet/Sasson, Multi-Party Arbitration, 1 S. A. R. 1 (2002), p. 10.
23 It reads as follows: 
2. Where a third party requests to participate in arbitral proceedings already pending under 
these Rules or where a party to arbitral proceedings under these Rules intends to cause a 
third party to participate in the arbitration, the arbitral tribunal shall decide on such request, 
after consulting with all parties, taking into account all circumstances it deems relevant and 
applicable.
24 It reads as follows: 
Unless the parties at any time agree otherwise in writing, the Arbitral Tribunal shall have 
the power, on the application of any party or of its own motion, but in either case only after 
giving the parties a reasonable opportunity to State their views: […] 
h) to allow, only upon the application of a party, one or more third persons to be joined 
in the arbitration as a party provided any such third person and the applicant party have 
consented thereto in writing, and thereafter to make a single fi nal award, or separate awards, 
in respect of all parties so implicated in the arbitration..
25 It reads as follows: 
The Tribunal has power to: […] (b) allow other parties to be joined in the arbitration 
with their express consent, and make a single fi nal award determining all disputes between 
them.
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this report in two important respects. First, joinder implies some contractual 
connection between the existing parties and the party to be joined. Second, 
joinder implies that there are no concurrent proceedings—in other words, the 
party to be joined is not already involved in proceedings.
2.5 Class actions and class arbitrations
A class action allows a plaintiff to sue for injuries on his or her own 
behalf and on behalf of third persons in a similar situation for injury done 
to them.26 While class actions are popular in the United States,27 as well as 
in other common law countries,28 civil law countries are reluctant to enact 
or apply such a mechanism. Where it exists, it usually is limited to certain 
types of claims, such as consumer claims. Sometimes the participation in mass 
consumer proceedings is restricted even further to consumer associations only. 
Notwithstanding these reservations, the trend is evolving towards more mass 
proceedings even in countries traditionally opposed to them.29 This trend takes 
two forms: the vindication of diffuse interests through claims by associations, 
and the vindication of interests of individuals affected by the same category of 
harmful occurrence who form a defi ned group that transfers its right of action 
to a representative, be it a public trustee or an association.30
Keeping aside actions by associations, class actions generally are based on a 
system of certifi cation of the class and notifi cation to the members of the class.31 
26 B. Hanotiau, supra note 2, p. 260.
27 Rule 23 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). See also the Class Action Fairness 
Act, Feb. 18, 2005, which enlarges the federal jurisdiction. For more information about the Class Action 
Fairness Act; see Simmons/Borden, The Defense Perspective: the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 and 
State Law Antitrust Actions, 20 Antitrust ABA 19 (2005).
28 In Australia, representative proceedings (Federal Court of Australia Amendment Act 1991, No. 
181); in the United Kingdom: Group Litigation Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules (Rule 19); in Canada: 
Class Procedures Act of British Columbia, Class Proceedings Act of Alberta, and Class Proceedings Act 
of Ontario. 
29 The Swedish Group Proceedings Act of 2002 provides for proceedings similar to the U.S. class 
action. In France, class actions do not exist, but actions can be fi led by consumer associations (Art. 
421 Code de la consommation). The French Senate debates whether to introduce class actions, Senate 
Information Report No. 249, session of Mar. 14, 2006. In Spain, class actions are provided for consumer 
litigation (see in part. Arts. 6.1.7, 7.7, 11, 13.1, 15 of the Civil Procedure Act).
30 G. D. Watson, Class Actions, the Canadian Experience, 11 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 269 (2001), 
p. 273.
31 To be certifi ed as a class action, the claim must satisfy several prerequisites: commonality, 
numerosity or impracticability of joinder, typicality, representativeness and adequate defi nition of the 
class. B. Hanotiau, supra note 2, p. 262; I. Romy, Class actions américaines et droit international privé suisse, 
7 AJP 783 (1999), p. 786; G. D. Watson, supra note 30, p. 273; Marcus/Sherman, Complex Litigation, 
Cases and Materials on Advanced Civil Procedure (1998), pp. 220 et seq. 
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Each member can then opt out of or into the proceedings, depending on the 
applicable legal system.32 The exercise or non-exercise of the option will determine 
whether the forthcoming judgment is binding on a given class member. 
Class actions usually are submitted to the courts. In recent years, however, 
there has been a movement in the United States in favor of resolving class actions 
through arbitration. In Green Tree v. Bazzle,33 the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that class arbitration may be available even if the contract is silent, and that the 
arbitrators have the power to decide whether the contract allows class arbitration 
or not. It further held that the arbitrators have the power to certify the class.34 
Arbitral institutions take diverging approaches to class arbitration. The ICC 
issued a statement opposing class actions, which must be seen as an opposition to 
class arbitrations as well. Conversely, following Bazzle, the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA) drew up its Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations. 
These rules are inspired from the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
provide for a regime of arbitral certifi cation and notifi cation of the class. The 
parties can opt out of these rules, and the AAA does not administer requests for 
class actions where the agreement prohibits class claims, consolidation or joinder, 
unless the courts compel the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration or 
to the AAA.35 
As a consequence of Bazzle and the increasing popularity of class arbitrations, 
companies now often include waivers of class arbitration in their standard 
contract terms. The validity of such a waiver currently is unsettled,36 and the 
32 See Rule 23.c. 2 of the U.S. FRCP; Art. 33.J of the Federal Court of Australia Amendment Act 
1991, No. 181; Sections 13 and 14 of the Swedish Group Proceedings Act.
33 Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). Prior to Bazzle, the courts decided 
whether class arbitration was available, and absent an express agreement, it was deemed precluded.
34 Previously, Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp. (In re Knepp), 229 B.R. 821 (Bankr. D. Ala. 1999) 
appears to have been the only case not reversed that held that arbitration would interfere with class action 
relief and would eliminate any opportunity for effective redress. See also Hagans/Rustay, Class Actions in 
Arbitration, 25 Rev. Litig. 293 (2006), p. 307.
35 AAA Policy on Class Arbitrations Notice published on July 14, 2005, available at <http://www.adr.
org/sp.asp?id=25967>, last visited on May 31, 2006. The AAA is administering about 95 class arbitrations 
at present.
36 Among others, one may refer further to the following cases: Zawikowski v. Benefi cial Nat’l Bank, 
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 514 (D. Ill. 1999) (an arbitration agreement prohibiting class arbitration unless 
all parties consent to it was held admissible); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1094 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2002) (the contract provision prohibiting class arbitration was deemed null and void on grounds 
of unconscionability and violation of public policy); Luna v. Household Fin. Corp. Iii, 236 F. Supp. 2d 
1166, 1183 (D. Wash. 2002). See also, Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (Cal. 2005), a 
case in which the California Court of Appeal admitted the waiver, but the California Supreme Court held 
that the waiver involving consumer claims was unconscionable under California law and should not be 
enforced.
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U.S. Supreme Court has still to rule on it.37 It remains to be seen whether and 
to what extent the mechanism of class actions and arbitrations may inspire 
workable solutions for the consolidation of multiple proceedings in investment 
arbitration.
2.6 Creation of a special tribunal
One method to resolve multiple disputes arising out of the same event is to 
create a special tribunal and entrust it with the settlement of all such disputes. 
This method has the obvious advantage of allowing the tribunal and the 
procedures to be shaped in accordance with the characteristics of the disputes 
and the needs of an effi cient administration of justice. It requires, however, 
the existence of political will and the availability of signifi cant resources. These 
requirements are likely to be met only for major crises or as a result of strong 
pressures.
As examples of such special tribunals in the last decades, one may cite the 
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal created by the Algiers Accords of 1981 following the 
Iranian revolution; the United Nations Compensation Commission created by 
Resolution 692 of the Security Council following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
in 1990; the Claims Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Accounts created by 
a private agreement entered into by two Jewish organizations and the Swiss 
Bankers’ Association in 1996; and the German Forced Labour Compensation 
Program based on an agreement between Germany and the United States in 
2000.38
2.7 Alignment of tribunals or de facto consolidation
Another method for handling connected claims is arbitral institutions 
setting up, or encouraging the parties to set up, tribunals composed of the 
same arbitrators for related cases. Examples in recent ICSID practice are 
Salini v. Morocco and R.F.C.C. v. Morocco,39 the four Aguas v. Argentina water 
37 A party attempted to have the Supreme Court review the enforceability of the waiver in Cingular 
Wireless, LLC v. Mendoza et al. The Court declined, however, to review that later and denied certiorari in 
June 2006. The procedural history of such case is complex. The unreported opinion which resulted in the 
certiorari petition is Parrish v. Cingular Wireless, LLC of the Californian Court of Appeal (No. A105518 
of Nov. 2, 2005).
38 On these mechanisms, see Boisson de Chazournes/Quéguiner/Villalpando, Crimes de l’histoire et 
réparations: les réponses du droit et de la justice (2004).
39 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4; 
Consortium R.F.C.C. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6.
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concession cases,40 and the two EDF v. Argentina electricity concession 
cases.41 
Although this practice allows the avoidance of inconsistent results,42 it 
does not necessarily permit rationalizing the use of resources, as submissions, 
hearings and decisions are often separate for each proceeding. Moreover, 
this method may raise issues of due process if a tribunal relies on knowledge 
acquired in one case to resolve another. This concern arose, for instance, in the 
1982 Adgas case,43 in which the same arbitrator was appointed to decide two 
related arbitrations. However, in the absence of consent, the arbitrator declined 
to hear both arbitrations together,44 despite Lord Denning’s suggestions to that 
effect.45 
40 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua 
S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17; Aguas Cordobesas S.A., Suez, and Sociedad 
General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/18; Suez, Sociedad 
General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/19; and one UNCITRAL arbitration.
41 Electricidad Argentina S.A. and EDF International S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/22; EDF International S.A., SAUR International S.A. and León Participaciones Argentinas S.A. 
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23.
42 The risk of inconsistent results might arguably exist even with de facto consolidation, or at least that 
was the view expressed by the High Court of Hong Kong in the Shui On case, Re Shui On Construction 
Ltd. and Schindler Lifts (HK) Ltd, HKLR 117 (1986), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, A.J. van den 
Berg (ed.), Vol. XIV (1989), p. 215. See H. Miller, Consolidation in Hong Kong: the Shui On case, 3 Arb. 
Int’l 87 (1987), p. 88.
43 Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Co. Ltd v. Eastern Bechtel Corp. (hereinafter Adgas), 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 425, CA (1982); XXI International Legal Materials 1057 (1982); Rev. Arb. 119 (1983); Yearbook 
Commercial Arbitration 448 (1984).
44 V.V.Veeder, England, in Jan Paulsson (Ed.), International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration, 
Supp. 23, 1997, fn. 34.
45 Adgas supra note 43. At relevant part the decision reads:
At an early stage, he [the arbitrator] should have held what may be called a “pre-trial 
conference” with all the parties in the two arbitrations. At the pre-trial conference there 
should be a segregation of issues. There will be some issues which can be separated and can 
be decided by themselves. They should be decided in the fi rst arbitration at that stage. If 
necessary, there can be recourse to the courts on points of construction and so forth. At all 
events, points which can be separated should be dealt with separately in the fi rst place. There 
may be some which cannot be separated—namely, the very important point of causation. In 
those circumstances, the arbitrator will have control of the case. At the second stage, he may 
well think it right to be relieved from arbitrating any further in the arbitration. He can then 
be replaced by a new arbitrator in respect of those issues. That can be done on application. 
In that way, all the parties can feel that there has been a fair hearing: and that they will not 
have been prejudiced by any preconceived notions of the one arbitrator. 
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2.8 State-to-state arbitration
The ICSID Convention provides that disputes concerning its interpretation 
or application will be submitted to the ICJ’s jurisdiction.46 Similarly, BITs provide 
for state-to-state dispute settlement through arbitration, if other alternative 
methods, such as consultations, good offi ces, mediation or consultation, have 
failed.47 These dispute settlement procedures are intended to achieve uniform 
interpretation and application of the BITs.48
The coexistence of investor-state and state-to-state arbitration provisions 
in a treaty entails the risk of multiple procedures related to the same dispute. 
Article 27 of the ICSID Convention seeks to avoid the occurrence of this risk 
by providing that “[n]o Contracting State shall . . . bring an international claim, 
in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals shall have consented to submit 
or shall have submitted to arbitration under this Convention, unless such other 
Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply with the award 
rendered in such dispute.” Some BITs include similar restrictions.49 Where such 
restrictions exist, the risk of multiple proceedings may, nevertheless, arise to some 
extent. Indeed, the restriction does not apply before the investor-state claim 
is brought, nor does it prevent a state from bringing an interstate arbitration 
on an abstract issue of treaty interpretation even while an investor-state claim 
is pending.50 On a broad reading of Article 27, the tribunal in the interstate 
46 Art. 64 of the ICSID Convention reads as follows: 
Any dispute arising between Contracting States concerning the interpretation or application 
of this Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall be referred to the International 
Court of Justice by the application of any party to such dispute, unless the States concerned 
agree to another method of settlement.
47 Art. 37 of the U.S. Model BIT; Ch. 22 of the Chile-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA); Ch. 20 
of the U.S.-Morocco FTA; Ch. 20 of the NAFTA; Ch. 20 of the Central America-Dominican Republic-
United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR); Ch. 15 of the Japan-Mexico FTA; Ch. 18 of the 
Australia-Thailand FTA; Art. 9 of the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT.
48 See also Art. 37 of the U.S. Model BIT, Art. 150 of the Japan-Mexico FTA, Art. 9 of the Switzerland-
Uruguay BIT, Art. 10 of the Chile- Switzerland BIT, Art. 1801 of the Australia-Thailand FTA (mentioning 
disputes concerning the implementation of the agreement).
49 Art. 10.4 Switzerland-Uruguay BIT allows state-to-state arbitration when an award on a dispute 
between the investor and the host state has been decided, only when the host state rejects or does not 
comply with the award. See also Ch. 8, Art. 14.6 Singapore-Australia FTA; Art. 917 Thailand-Australia 
FTA; and provisions cited in Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2001), 
p. 404; and in W. Ben Hamida, L’arbitrage transnational face à un désordre procédural: la concurrence 
des procédures et les confl its de juridictions, Transnational Dispute Management (March 2006), p. 16 
(provisional version).
50 See W. Ben Hamida, supra note 49. Consent is not given by the investor to arbitration under an 
investment treaty provision until he explicitly accepts it or starts proceedings. Hence, before such a time, 
Art. 27 of the ICSID Convention does not apply (see Schreuer, supra note 49, p. 409), nor do similar BIT 
provisions. 
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arbitration may well decline jurisdiction if the claim is brought to obstruct or 
infl uence the investor-state proceedings.51 
It has been suggested that state-to-state arbitration may be an alternative 
to consolidation. Indeed, state-to-state arbitration could provide a general 
answer to an issue of interpretation of the BIT, which may then be applicable 
to disputes between one of the contracting states and a (possibly large) number 
of individual investors. At the same time, however, such an alternative has a 
number of drawbacks, which may well jeopardize its usefulness in most cases.
First, a state may be unwilling to commence an arbitration against the other 
contracting state, for reasons unrelated to the actual investment and dispute. 
State-to-state investment arbitration has many of the known disadvantages of 
diplomatic protection, which investor-state arbitration precisely was meant to 
overcome.52 Second, this alternative would imply a duplication of proceedings, 
which is precisely what consolidation seeks to avoid. In addition to increased 
costs, the duplication would entail signifi cant delays, as it would be necessary 
to await the decision rendered in the state-to-state arbitration to apply it in 
the individual investor-state proceeding. There would not be duplication if the 
investors and the host state are able to settle their dispute on the basis of the 
decision issued in the state-to-state arbitration. If there are strong and realistic 
expectations that the dispute may be settled once a key issue submitted to state-
to-state arbitration is resolved, then such a method may be worth considering. 
Yet, in this context, it should also be stressed that the issue of the jurisdiction of 
the interstate arbitration tribunal and the issue of the stay of the investor-state 
arbitration tribunal would have to be settled by agreement. Third, state-to-state 
arbitration would only be a substitute for consolidation where all investors are 
of the same nationality, a restriction that does not apply to consolidation and 
that considerably limits the use of state-to-state arbitration in practice.
2.9 Publication of decisions
Whenever confi dentiality is not a bar, the publication of decisions and 
awards can help minimize the risk of inconsistency. Indeed, a review of case 
law shows that arbitrators take decisions of other international tribunals into 
account even though there is no doctrine of precedent in international law and 
Article 53 of the ICSID Convention provides that awards are binding only on 
the parties.
51 Schreuer, supra note 49, p. 405.
52 J. L. Brierley, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace (1963), p. 
277.
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ICSID has a well-established practice of publishing decisions and awards if 
the parties agree, as provided for in Article 48(5) of the ICSID Convention.53 
Even if the parties do not consent to publication, the ICSID Arbitration Rules 
authorize the Centre to publish excerpts of the legal reasoning of the tribunal.54 
Moreover, ICSID publishes the names of the parties, the identity of the tribunal 
members and the procedural progress of each case on its website. This allows 
for some scrutiny and awareness of existing cases even if they are not yet, nor 
ever, published.55 In addition, many decisions in ICSID and NAFTA cases are 
posted on the Internet even if they are not published by ICSID.56
Due to confi dentiality requirements, publication is more restricted with 
respect to arbitrations conducted under other institutional rules and in ad hoc 
arbitrations.57
2.10 Aggregate litigation 
When reviewing the tools to deal with multiple and related proceedings, 
it may be worthwhile to consider the American Law Institute’s recent Draft 
53 Art. 48(5) of the ICSID Convention reads as follows: “The Centre shall not publish the award 
without the consent of the parties.”
54 Rule 48(4) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules reads as follows: 
The Centre shall not publish the award without the consent of the parties. The Centre 
shall, however, promptly include in its publications excerpts of the legal reasoning of the 
Tribunal.
This Rule was recently amended in order to allow the Centre to publish at least some excerpts 
when the parties take several months to give their consent or simply do not give it at all. See, ICSID 
Secretariat, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, Discussion Paper, Oct. 22, 
2004, available at <www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/DiscussionPaper.pdf>, last visited June 30, 2006, 
pp. 7 et seq.
55 B. King, Consistency of Awards in Cases of Parallel Proceedings Concerning Related Subject 
Matters, in E. Gaillard (ed.), Towards a Uniform International Arbitration Law? (2005), p. 312.
56 See, e.g., <www.nafta-sec-alena.org/> last visited June 30, 2006; <www.investmentclaims.com/> 
last visited June 30, 2006; <http://www.naftaclaims.com>, last visited June 30, 2006. 
57 Art. 32.5 of the UNCITRAL Rules allows publication only with the consent of the parties. The 
ICC Arbitration Rules contain no provisions regarding publications and confi dentiality. However, Article 
6 of the Statutes of the ICC Court provides that the work of the ICC Court is confi dential. Further, Art. 
1.3 of the Internal Rules establishes that “the documents submitted to the Court, or drawn up by it in 
the course of its proceedings, are communicated only to the members of the Court and to the Secretariat 
and to persons authorized by the Chairman to attend Court sessions.” Since the awards are documents 
submitted to the ICC Court, there is no doubt about their confi dential nature. Exceptions can be granted 
for research and educational purposes, as provided in Article 1.4 of the Internal Rules. Indeed, the ICC 
publishes summaries of ICC awards in its Bulletin or in the book series “Collection of ICC Arbitral 
Awards,” which contains awards since 1974. The awards are not identifi ed by party names. For more 
information about confi dentiality of awards under the ICC Rules, see Craig/Park/Paulsson, International 
Chamber of Commerce Arbitration (2000), pp. 311 et seq.
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Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation.58 Designed for court litigation, 
this draft seeks to promote effi ciency in the use of litigation resources while 
treating equitably the interests of all the parties and others involved. Procedures 
for aggregating claims are designed to respect the rights and remedies provided 
by substantive law (the principle of fi delity), the institutional capability of the 
courts (the principle of feasibility), and the interests of all affected parties and 
other persons.59
The main characteristic of aggregation is to treat common issues together. 
In that sense, it is close to consolidation as the term is defi ned in this report. 
The draft addresses a broad range of procedural situations. It covers three 
types of aggregate lawsuits,60 two of which are relevant for the purposes of this 
report: (i) joinders, which encompass all forms of proceedings with multiple 
claimants and respondents as formal parties and which resemble consolidation as 
dealt with in this report; and (ii) administrative aggregation, which encompasses 
the coordination of separate lawsuits and is analogous to de facto consolidation 
considered in the following subchapter.61 Aggregate treatment may include 
actions in which the parties seek indivisible and divisible remedies, the latter 
typically being monetary damages. In this respect, the purpose of aggregation is 
to “maximize the net value of a group of claims,” for example, of the monetary 
relief awarded after litigation costs are deducted.62
Aggregate treatment is a matter of judicial decision. In exercising its 
discretion “at an early practical time,” the court will start by identifying 
possible common issues, which are defi ned as “those legal or factual issues that 
are identical or substantially identical in content across multiple civil claims, 
regardless of whether their disposition would resolve all contested issues in 
litigation.”63 The court will then give notice to the parties and ascertain that 
their rights are protected. It will also pay attention to the judicial feasibility of 
aggregation. It “should not lightly undertake aggregate treatment of a common 
issue or of related claims,” but should do so only “upon careful consideration 
of the procedural alternatives” and “the articulation of the specifi c procedures 
58 Discussion Draft 1 of April 1, 2006.
59 Id. para. 1.01.
60 Id. These are called judicial aggregations, as opposed to private aggregations, where multiple parties 
proceed under non-judicial supervision, such as inventory settlements (para. 1.02).
61 Id. The third type deals with so-called representative aggregations, i.e., lawsuits in which a formal 
party stands in judgment on behalf of others who are not formal parties, such as class actions (para. 1.02(a) 
and Comment).
62 Id. Comment (e) to para. 1.05. 
63 Id. para. 2.02.
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for the aggregate proceeding.”64 This latter obligation is cast in terms of the 
formulation of a trial plan.65
For our purposes, the draft Principles on Aggregate Litigation are of interest 
primarily because they are representative of a general concern for effi ciency 
in the use of dispute resolution resources. On a more practical level, they are 
instructive especially for the emphasis they place on procedural feasibility and 
the need to formulate procedures for the joint proceedings, matters which also 
must be considered carefully when consolidating investment disputes.
2.11 Consolidation 
Although its use remains exceptional, consolidation is provided for in a 
number of legal texts, including:
• National arbitration statutes such as Article 1446 of the Netherlands 
Arbitration Act 1986 (Code of Civil Procedure (NCCP)) or Section 
24 of the Australian International Arbitration Act (AIAA);66
• Institutional rules: only a few institutional rules contain a provision 
on consolidation. Among these are Article 4 of the Swiss International 
Arbitration Rules and Article 7 of the Arbitration Rules of the 
Mexico Arbitration Centre (MAC);67
• International treaties: recent investment treaties increasingly 
incorporate rules on consolidation. These include Article 1126 of 
the NAFTA, Article 33 of the U.S. Model BIT,68 and Article 32 of 
the Canadian Model BIT.
As mentioned above, in this report the term “consolidation” refers to the 
joinder of two or more proceedings that already are pending before different 
tribunals. The report focuses on consolidation of proceedings pending before 
arbitral tribunals in investment disputes. It is limited to situations in which 
a host state faces claims from a number of investors. This situation must be 
distinguished from the one in which several investors—for instance, a local 
64 Id. Comment to para. 2.13.
65 Id. para. 2.13.
66 See also Section 35 of the English Arbitration Act (EAA) and Section 9 of the Ireland Arbitration 
(International Commercial) Act (IAICA), which are less detailed.
67 See also Art. 7 of the Arbitration Rules of the American Land Title Association.
68 As well as a number of other treaties concluded by the United States, specifi cally Art. 33 of the 
Uruguay-U.S. BIT; Art. 15.24 of the U.S.-Singapore FTA; Art. 10.24 of the U.S.-Morocco FTA; and Art. 
10.24.2 of the Chile-U.S. FTA. 
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special vehicle company and its foreign shareholders—start an arbitration 
against the host state together. Accordingly, the defi nition used here does not 
cover multiparty or multicontract arbitrations and joinder of third parties in 
their traditional meaning, nor joinder of different claims between the same 
parties. 
As will be discussed in more detail below, consolidation is available if there 
is a connection between the proceedings and if it contributes to effi cient dispute 
settlement. Other requirements are more controversial, especially the necessity 
of consent.
3. DESIRABILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF CONSOLIDATION 
Consolidation primarily presents advantages related to the effi cient 
administration of justice and cost savings (3.2 below).69 Indeed, dealing with the 
same or related matters in separate proceedings can result in much ineffi ciency. 
In particular, consolidation relieves a state from the hardship of having to defend 
itself separately against multiple claims arising from the same measure.70 It has 
the further advantage of avoiding contradictory decisions on the same state 
measure. On the other hand, consolidation also has drawbacks, mainly risks of 
violation of due process (3.4 below) and of confi dentiality (3.3 below).
3.1  Consistency and avoidance of contradictory decisions
Dealing with the same situation in different proceedings can result in 
contradictory decisions.71 In the terms used by the Softwood Lumber tribunal:
Cases with different parties may present the same legal issues arising out 
of the same event or related to the same measure. Confl icting results 
may take place if the fi ndings with respect to those issues differ in two 
or more cases.72
69 Order of the Consolidation Tribunal, Sept. 7, 2005, granting the consolidation of the cases Canfor 
Corporation v. United States of America, Tembec et al. v. United States of America and Terminal Forest 
Products Ltd. v. United States of America (hereinafter Softwood Lumber), n. 76, using the term “procedural 
economy.”
70 H.C. Alvarez, Arbitration under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 16 Arb. In’l 393 
(2000), p. 414.
71 The advantages of consistency and avoidance of contradictory decisions have also been raised for 
the joinder of third parties and the joinder of claims and proceedings between the same parties. P. Level, 
La jonction de procédures, intervention de tiers et demandes additionnelles et reconventionnelles, 7 Bull. 
CIArb. ICC 36 (1996), pp. 39, 43; Whitesell/Silva-Romero, supra note 20, p. 17.
72 Softwood Lumber, supra note 69, n. 133.
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The recent decisions in the CME / Lauder cases have shown that the risk of 
contradictions is real. It is made even more real by the fact that arbitral awards 
are not subject to appeal, but only to limited review. In such proceedings, the 
court (or another body) will not re-examine the facts or the application of the 
law (subject to public policy).73 It is also said that the risk of contradiction 
increases when the substantive and procedural laws applied in the different 
cases are not the same.74 
Consolidation is generally deemed to avoid confl icting decisions.75 The 
Softwood Lumber consolidation tribunal shared this view when it stated that an 
effective administration of justice requires the avoidance of confl icting results 
through a system of consolidation.76 
While the objective of avoiding confl icting outcomes through 
consolidation prevailed in Softwood Lumber and in other cases,77 it must 
sometimes yield to other interests or considerations. For instance, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in United Kingdom v. Boeing that 
even though inconsistent determinations may be a valid concern, it could not 
allow the tribunal to reform the parties’ contract and that the parties should 
have provided for consolidation in the arbitration clauses.78 In other words, 
the enforcement of the contract prevailed over the avoidance of inconsistent 
decisions.
Another factor against which the objective of consistency must be weighed 
is the fairness (or lack of fairness) of consolidated proceedings. This is a 
consideration that led the Corn Products tribunal to rule against consolidation 
in the following terms:
73 E. Gaillard, Jonction de procédures arbitrale et judiciaire, L’arbitrage complexe, Special Supplement 
Bull. CIArb. ICC 37 (2003), p. 38; P. Leboulanger, Multi-contract Arbitration, 13 J. Int’l Arb. 43 (1996), 
p. 63; J. C. Chiu, Consolidation of Arbitral Proceeding and International Arbitration, 7 J. Int’l Arb. 53 
(1990), p. 56.
74 B. Hanotiau, Complex—Multi-contract Multi-party—Arbitrations, 14 Arb. Int’l 369 (1998), p. 
391. 
75 E. Wallace, Consolidated Arbitration in the U.S—Recent Authority Requires Consent of the 
Parties, 10 J. Int’l Arb. 5 (1993), p. 17.
76 Softwood Lumber, supra note 69, n. 131.
77 Taunton-Collins v. Cromie, 2 All ER 332 (1964), 1 WLR 633 (1964). See also the Adgas case, supra 
note 43, where Lord Denning argued in favor of de facto consolidation:
“It seems to me that there is ample power in the court to appoint in each arbitration the same 
arbitrator. It seems to me highly desirable that it should be done so as to avoid inconsistent 
fi ndings….”
78 Government of United Kingdom of Great Britain v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1993); 1993 
U.S. App. LEXIS 15955; 26 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 33; 1993 AMC 2906.
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The risk of unfairness to Mexico from inconsistent awards resulting from 
separate proceedings cannot outweigh the unfairness to the claimants 
of the procedural ineffi ciencies that would arise in consolidated 
proceedings….79 
Admittedly, the Corn Products tribunal had previously noted that the 
claimants were willing to accept the risk of inconsistent awards and that such a 
risk was not signifi cant in the circumstances because the claims appeared to be 
suffi ciently different.80 
3.2 Effi ciency: Saving time and costs
It is obvious that consolidation saves time and costs for the party that 
is involved in all the proceedings being consolidated—in other words, the 
respondent state in investment arbitration. Indeed, with consolidation, every 
disputed matter is litigated only once.81 This applies to the allegations of facts, 
the production of evidence,82 and the presentation of legal arguments.
The extent that consolidation benefi ts investors is debatable. In terms of 
costs, the investors may share certain expenses, such as expert or legal fees. 
Such sharing implies, however, that they can agree on a common strategy. In 
terms of time, consolidated proceedings are bound to last longer than a separate 
arbitration.
This last consideration leads to the main disadvantage of consolidated 
proceedings. Even with effective case management, such proceedings are likely 
to be more time-consuming and cumbersome than each individual proceeding. 
They may also leave more room for dilatory tactics. Furthermore, parties who 
seek a decision on certain matters may have to bear increased costs, subject to a 
well-balanced fi nal allocation, and may have to sit through a long and complex 
procedure on matters of no interest to them. If only their individual claims were 
considered, the procedure would be shorter and less expensive.83 This drawback 
79 Order of the Consolidation Tribunal, May 20, 2005, refusing the consolidation of cases in Corn 
Products International Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01, and Archer 
Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/04/5 (hereinafter Corn Products), available at <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
Corn_Archer_order_en.pdf>, at n. 17.
80 Id. n. 16.
81 Whitesell/Silva-Romero, supra note 20, p. 17; M. Platte, When Should an Arbitrator Join Cases?, 
18 Arb. Int’l 67 (2002), p. 78.
82 E. Gaillard, supra note 73, p. 38. 
83 Id. p. 39; G. A. Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2001), p. 675. 
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may be alleviated by providing for partial consolidation of only the relevant 
common issues.
3.3 Confi dentiality
It is said that consolidation raises issues of confi dentiality to the extent 
that a joined party may have access to protected information, such as business 
secrets, to which it would not otherwise have been privy. This risk is especially 
important if the parties joined are competitors.84 
However, this risk can often be avoided. The proceedings can be structured 
in such a manner so as to restrict a party’s access to information that is not 
relevant to its own case.85 Furthermore, measures can be taken to protect 
privileged information like in any other arbitration.
The issue of confi dentiality arose in both the Corn Products and the Softwood 
Lumber proceedings. In Corn Products, the consolidation tribunal held that the 
joined parties were competitors and that consolidating the proceedings would 
imply disclosing their business strategies, production costs and plant designs. 
It further found that measures to protect this information would make the 
arbitral process too complex and affect the competition between the parties.86 
By contrast, the subsequent decision of the arbitral tribunal in Softwood Lumber 
reached a different conclusion:
[C]oncerns over confi dentiality are, in the view of the 
ConsolidationTribunal, not relevant when considering a request for 
consolidation, save for exceptional cases where consolidation would 
defeat effi ciency of process or would infringe the principle of due 
process....87 
And further:
It has never been seriously suggested that arbitration cannot proceed in 
those cases for the mere reason that the parties are competitors and that 
disclosure of confi dential information is purportedly bound to occur.88
84 M. Platte, supra note 81, p. 79.
85 J.C. Chiu, supra note 73, p. 60.
86 Corn Products, supra note 79, n. 7–9.
87 Softwood Lumber, supra note 69, n. 138.
88 Id. n. 141.
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The tribunal then found that certain available measures could ensure 
confi dential treatment of information.89 Hence, confi dentiality was not a reason 
to oppose to consolidation.
3.4 Due process and case management
Due process concerns may arise in the sense that an individual party’s 
fundamental procedural rights may not be as well-protected in a collective or 
mass process than in a bilateral or bipolar one. The risk of due process violations 
exists with respect to the rights of both parties. The risk exists, on the one hand, 
for the multiple claimants whose individual case may be buried by a mass of 
other arguments, which may entail a breach of their opportunity to be heard. 
The risk exists, on the other hand, for the sole respondent who must fi ght alone 
against many, which may give rise to equal treatment concerns.
Adequate case management is expected to prevent these problems. The 
manner in which to conduct multiparty proceedings is generally left to the 
tribunal’s discretion. As a result, especially high demands are made on the 
arbitrators’ case management know-how. One may ask whether guidelines for 
streamlining the process could be helpful or whether they would be of no use 
because the appropriate procedures are too case-specifi c. 
One aspect of due process that cannot be resolved through good case 
management is the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. As a rule, the parties 
have an equal right to participate in the formation of the arbitral tribunal. In 
the event of a consolidation, there are different ways of avoiding such a violation 
of equal rights.
If a new tribunal is formed to rule on the consolidated case as in the NAFTA, 
an institution can appoint all its members, such as by the Secretary-General of 
ICSID under the NAFTA.90 If no new tribunal is formed but the new case is 
submitted to an existing tribunal, the rules may provide that the new parties 
waive their right to appoint the tribunal.91
4. CONDITIONS OF CONSOLIDATION IN COMMERCIAL AND 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
4.1 Connexity
The primary requirement for consolidation is connexity or the existence 
of a connection between the cases to be consolidated. In legal provisions 
89 Id. n. 143.
90 NAFTA Art. 1126(5).
91 E.g., Art. 4(1) of the Swiss Rules. 
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concerning consolidation, the idea of connection is expressed in quite different 
terms. Some provisions defi ne connexity as implying “questions of law or fact 
... in common,”92 occasionally adding that these common questions “arise 
out of the same events or circumstances.”93 Other texts require that there be a 
risk of confl icting decisions if the matters are handled separately.94 Still others 
simply refer to cases concerning the same subject matter on account of the 
connection between them,95 without specifying the nature of this connection. 
Finally, in other cases, there is no mention of any condition of connection,96 and 
consolidation is allowed whenever there are reasons that make it desirable.97
4.2 Fair and effi cient dispute resolution
Under the rules of the NAFTA and certain BITs, the arbitral tribunal 
deciding on the consolidation must rule “in the interest of fair and effi cient 
resolution of the claims.”98 In other words, fair and effi cient resolution is a 
necessary condition for consolidation. Similarly, certain national statutes or 
institutional rules require that the prejudice arising from a failure to consolidate 
not be outweighed by the risk of undue delay, hardship or prejudice to the 
rights of parties opposing consolidation.99
The previous section discusses some of the factors that must be taken 
into account when assessing the requirement of fair and effi cient resolution of 
92 NAFTA Art. 1126.2; Section 24.1.a of the AIAA; Section 6B of the Hong Kong Arbitration 
Ordinance (HKAO); Art. 684.12 of the Florida International Arbitration Act (FIAA), establishing the 
alternative that the disputes arise out of a single transaction or enterprise.
93 Art. 10.25 of the CAFTA-DR; Art. 33 of the Uruguay-U.S. BIT; Art. 15.24 of the U.S.-Singapore 
FTA.
94 Section 10 of the U.S. Uniform Arbitration Act 2001 (UAA) and Art. 28.3 of the Brussels 
Regulation.
95 Art. 39 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Free Trade Association Court (EFTA Rules); Art. 
43 of the Rules of Procedure of the ECJ (ECJ Rules); Art. 1046 of the NCCP.
96 Art. 47 of the Rules of the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS Rules); Art. 26 of the Singapore 
Arbitration Act (SingAA); Section 35 of the EAA; Art. 1297.272 of the California Code of Civil Procedure 
(CCCP); Section 9 of the IAICA. As a condition for consolidation, Section 21 of the British Columbia 
Commercial Arbitration Act (BCCAA) requires an agreement of the parties on the appointment of the 
arbitrators, not a specifi c agreement to consolidate. Thus, making any agreement on the appointment 
implies making an agreement to consolidate.
97 Section 6B.1. lit. c) of the HKAO, allowing consolidation for some reason that makes it desirable 
to make an order. See also Section 2.4 lit.c) of the New Zealand Arbitration Act (NZAA) and Section 24.1 
lit. c) of the AIAA.
98 NAFTA Art. 1126.2; Art. 10.25.6 of the CAFTA-DR; Art. 33.6 of the U.S. Model BIT; Art. 33.6 
of the Uruguay-U.S. BIT; Art. 15.24.6 of the Singapore-U.S. FTA; Art. 32 of the Canada Model BIT; Art. 
G-27.2 of the Canada-Chile FTA; Art. 83.8 of the Japan-Mexico FTA.
99 Section 10 of the UAA. 
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the claims. The question to be addressed here is how these factors should be 
evaluated. 
In Softwood Lumber, the tribunal stated that these concepts were not relative. 
Accordingly, the requirement is not that consolidated proceedings be fairer and 
more effi cient than separate proceedings. The requirement is that an order of 
consolidation be fair and effi cient in and of itself.100 
This same condition also appears in the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles 
of Transnational Civil Procedure, which add the interests of justice as an 
alternative.101 Sometimes this condition is expressed as a desire of the parties 
for effi ciency. Other times, the requirement merely is that an order be desirable 
without further specifi cation.102
4.3 Consent of the parties
This requirement is one of the most heavily debated ones. The fi rst question 
obviously is whether consent is at all necessary. If it is, the question then arises 
as to its form, and whether it must be expressed or whether it can be implied. 
Although consent generally appears to be required, this is not an absolute 
rule. The Dutch Arbitration Act, for instance, requires no consent. However, it 
provides the possibility of opting out.103 Similarly, Section 6B of the Hong Kong 
Arbitration Act makes no reference to the parties’ consent to consolidate, but 
only to their agreement on the choice of the arbitrators. Lacking an agreement, 
the Court of First Instance appoints an arbitrator or umpire for the consolidated 
arbitration proceedings.104 Thus, a failure to agree on the arbitrator will not rule 
out consolidation. 
On the other hand, certain texts require the express consent of the parties.105 
Section 27 of the International Commercial Arbitration Act of British Columbia 
(BCICAA), for instance, requires a double consent: fi rst, it requires that the 
parties to two or more arbitration agreements agree to consolidate; second, it 
100 Softwood Lumber, supra note 69, n. 121 et seq. This interpretation can be transposed to Art. 
10.25.6 of the CAFTA-DR; Art. 33.6 of the U.S. Model BIT; Art. 33.6 of the Uruguay-U.S. BIT; Art. 
15.24.6 of the Singapore-U.S. FTA; Art. 32 of the Canada Model BIT; Art. G-27.2 of the Canada-Chile 
FTA; Art. 83.8 of the Japan-Mexico FTA, which have the same wording.
101 Art. 12.5 of the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles refers to “fair or more effi cient management and 
determination or in the interest of justice.”
102 Section 24.1.c of the AIAA reads: 
 “It is desirable that an order be made under this section.” See also Section 6B .1 lit. c) of the  
 HKAO. 
103 Art. 1046.1 of the NCCP.
104 Section 6B.2 of the HKAO.
105 Section 35 of the EAA; Art. 26 of the SingAA; Art. 684.12 of the FIAA; Section 21 of the BCCAA.
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provides that the Supreme Court may consolidate upon application by one 
party with the consent of all the other parties.
In the United States, the case law is not uniform. While some federal circuits 
hold that an express agreement of the parties on consolidation is necessary,106 
others accept an implied agreement to consolidate,107 and still others consider 
that the Federal Arbitration Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
authorize court-ordered consolidation even without consent.108
In investment arbitration based on a treaty containing a consolidation 
provision, the consent given to treaty arbitration is deemed to include consent 
to consolidation. This was stated in Softwood Lumber, where the tribunal found 
that consent to arbitration under Article 1121 of the NAFTA implied consent 
to Article 1126.109 
The same applies mutatis mutandis to the consent of parties who have 
submitted to institutional arbitration rules providing for consolidation. 
Thus, such rules are incorporated into the arbitration agreement and are 
enforceable.110
4.4 Identity of dispute settlement mechanisms
Another diffi culty raised by consolidation is the coordination of the 
different dispute settlement mechanisms applicable to the arbitrations to be 
joined. There are numerous possible combinations. The larger the differences 
between the mechanisms, the more diffi cult it becomes to consolidate:
• The contracts and/or applicable treaties contain the same arbitration clause 
or refer to the same institutional rules. In such event, there will be no bar to 
consolidation. 
106 I.e., 2nd, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 11th circuits; Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain v. Boeing Co., supra note 78; Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 275–77 (7th Cir. 1995); 
Baesler v. Continental Grain Co., 900 F2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1990); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Western Seas 
Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1984); Protective Life Ins. Corp. v. Lincoln National Life Ins. Corp., 
873 F.2d 281 (11th Cir. 1989).
107 Maxum Founds. v. Salus Corp., 817 F.2d 1086 (4th Cir. 1987), Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can., 210 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2000).
108 North River Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corp., 1991 WL 90735, at 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); 
Rio Energy Int’l v. Hilton Oil Transport, 776 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Seguros de Servicios de 
Salud v. McAuto Systems Group Inc., 121 F.R.D. 154 (D.P.R. 1988), reversed by 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 
8863.
109 Softwood Lumber, supra note 69, n. 79. The same solution can also be inferred with respect 
to some BITs that follow the same schema: Art. 33 of the Uruguay-U.S. BIT; Art. 15.24 of the U.S.-
Singapore FTA.
110 I. Ten Cate, Multi-party and Multi-contract Arbitrations: Procedural Mechanisms and 
Interpretation of Arbitration Agreements under U.S. Law, 15 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 133 (2004), p. 153.
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• The arbitration clauses are similar, but with the difference that some 
expressly allow consolidation and others are silent. It then will be necessary 
to look to the circumstances to decide on consolidation.
• The arbitration clauses are different in that they refer to another seat of the 
arbitration. This situation may be particularly problematic when the law of 
one seat permits consolidation and the law of the other does not. It will not 
arise, however, with ICSID arbitrations, which are isolated in this regard 
from national laws.
• The arbitration clauses are different or refer to different institutional rules. 
In this case, it cannot be assumed that there is an advance agreement to 
consolidate.111 This lack of agreement can be cured by later consent. If it is 
not, consolidation generally will be impossible.
• Some contracts provide for arbitration, while others refer the dispute to 
the courts. This situation is unlikely to occur in the fi eld of investment 
disputes, since investment treaties contain arbitration clauses (and where 
they provide for local courts as well, the investor is unlikely to choose such 
an option for treaty claims).
• The contracts or applicable treaties contain no dispute resolution provisions. 
It then will be necessary to take all the circumstances into account to decide 
whether to consolidate.112
When it addressed consolidation in the framework of the elaboration of the 
English Arbitration Act 1996, the Department Advisory Committee (DAC) 
identifi ed the following conditions, which may provide a further basis for 
discussions in the present context:
It seems to us realistically impossible to contemplate consolidation of 
separate arbitration proceedings unless at least the following conditions are 
satisfi ed:
• The arbitrations are by agreement to take place in the same country;
• The same law governs the related disputes;
• The same procedural rules govern the related disputes;
• The two tribunals are constituted in the same way.113
111 M. Platte, supra note 81, p. 72.
112 B. Hanotiau, supra note 74, p. 376.
113 Department Advisory Committee (DAC), Consolidation: The Second Report of the United 
Kingdom DAC on Arbitration Law, 7 Arb. Int’l 389 (1991).
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4.5 Other conditions: Consultation on consolidation
The conditions reviewed above are the ones most often found in legal texts on 
consolidation. Some texts, however, set additional conditions. These additional 
conditions often refer to the consolidation procedure. They include matters 
such as the obligation to give all the parties and the arbitrators an opportunity 
to be heard,114 or the communication of the application to the other tribunals, 
which, if practicable, must deliberate jointly on the application.115 
4.6 Discretion to order consolidation
Legislation often provides that, if the conditions for consolidation are 
met, it is within the tribunal’s discretion to order it.116 In other texts, once 
the conditions are fulfi lled, it is mandatory for the tribunal or the court to 
consolidate.117 
In some texts, the position is not clearly articulated or does not fi t exactly 
in either of these categories. A good example can be found in Article 33 of the 
U.S. Model BIT, which provides for the constitution of a consolidation tribunal 
unless the request is manifestly unfounded.
5. IMPLEMENTATION OF CONSOLIDATION IN COMMERCIAL 
AND INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
5.1 Legal basis for consolidation 
5.1.1 In commercial arbitration 
As noted above, the absence of a suffi cient legal basis for consolidation is 
one of the main diffi culties encountered by arbitrators and judges faced with a 
consolidation request. Even if some texts provide such a basis, they often fail to 
resolve all the procedural diffi culties that consolidation may cause. In the face 
114 Art. 1046 of the NCCP. See also Art. 4 of the Swiss Rules, ordering the Chambers to consult the 
parties to all proceedings; NAFTA Art. 1126; Art. 10.25 of the CAFTA-DR; Art. 39 of the EFTA Rules; 
Art. 43 of the ECJ Rules; Art. 33.6 of the U.S. Model BIT; Art. 33.6 of the Uruguay-U.S. BIT; Art. 
15.24.6 of the Singapore-U.S. FTA; Art. 32.2 of the Canada Model BIT; Art. G-27.2 of the Canada-Chile 
FTA; Art. 83.8 of the Japan-Mexico FTA.
115 Section 24.5 of the AIAA.
116 Softwood Lumber, supra note 69, n. 88 et seq. See also Art. 39 of the EFTA Rules; Art. 43 of the 
ECJ Rules; Art. 47 of the ITLOS Rules; Art. 12.5 of the UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil 
Procedure; Art. 1046 of the NCCP; Art. 3.9 of the Construction Industry Model Arbitration Rules; Art. 
7.2 of the GAFTA Form 125 Arbitration Rules; Art. F of the ICANN Uniform Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Policy, where the use of verb “may” indicates the discretion of the tribunal.
117 This seems to be the meaning of Section 9 of the IAICA; Art. 26 of the SingAA; and Section 35 
of the EAA.
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of such procedural uncertainties, it is not surprising that arbitrators and courts 
are reluctant to consolidate.
In commercial arbitration, statutory provisions are one possible basis 
for consolidation. A few national legislations provide such a basis. They 
either treat consolidation very briefl y,118 perhaps in the hope that this will 
discourage the application of the relevant provisions, or on the contrary are 
very detailed.119
Consolidation can also be arrived at by the operation of institutional 
arbitration rules—in other words, by agreement of the parties who deal with 
consolidation by incorporating the institutional rules into their contract and 
through the involvement of an arbitration institution. However, arbitration 
rules that provide for consolidation, for instance the Swiss Rules of International 
Arbitration, are the exception.
Ad hoc arbitration is the tool of choice for consolidation, if the parties agree 
on the procedures and conditions for consolidation and empower the courts 
or tribunals to consolidate. Ideally, the provisions for consolidation should 
be included in the arbitral agreement,120 and should specify the method for 
appointing the arbitrators.
5.1.2 In investment arbitration
A basis for consolidation exists in certain treaties, especially recent free trade 
agreements and BITs. The NAFTA is a prime example of such a treaty.121
By contrast, the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Arbitration Rules are 
silent on consolidation. Failing an express provision, it is untenable to argue 
that the institution or the arbitration tribunal has the power to consolidate 
separate arbitrations. Thus, the question arises of how to introduce a basis for 
consolidation in ICSID arbitration.
As all the contracting states must ratify any amendment to the ICSID 
Convention,122 a revision of the Convention cannot be the solution. Looking at 
the ICSID reform proposals in connection with the introduction of an appeals 
facility,123 one may envisage special rules on a consolidation facility. States could 
118 Section 35 of the EAA; Art. 26 of the SingAA; Art. 1297.272 of the CCCP.
119 In particular, Art. 1046 of the NCCP.
120 J. C. Chiu, supra note 73, p. 70.
121 NAFTA Art. 1126; Art. 10.25 of the CAFTA-DR; Art. 33 of the Uruguay-U.S. BIT; Art. 15.24 of 
the U.S.-Singapore FTA; Art. 10.24 of the Chile-U.S. FTA; Art. 10.24 of the Morocco-U.S. FTA.
122 Art. 66 of the ICSID Convention.
123 ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, supra note 54. 
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then opt into such a facility by way of provisions inserted in investment laws 
and treaties.
The ICC administers a fairly signifi cant number of arbitrations that are 
investment arbitrations in substance, or arbitrations based on an arbitration 
clause embodied in an investment contract between a private party and a state. 
The existing ICC Rules on multiparty arbitrations are insuffi cient to deal with 
the consolidation of arbitrations arising out of the same state measure or event. 
An amendment of the arbitration rules would be necessary to allow for such 
a consolidation. In considering such an amendment, one should obviously 
ask whether the inclusion of a consolidation provision, although undoubtedly 
benefi cial for investment arbitrations, would not deter commercial operators 
from resorting to ICC arbitration for their commercial disputes. If this were the 
case, then the consolidation mechanism should be part of a separate set of rules 
and not be incorporated in the arbitration rules.
A number of investment treaties provide the investor with an option to 
choose either ICSID, or ICC or UNCITRAL arbitration. The UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules do not allow consolidation. UNCITRAL may put the revision 
of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules on the agenda of the Working Group II 
on Arbitration. If this is done, which is likely, then the revision could include 
the incorporation of rules on consolidation.124
An additional question arises in connection with the basis for consolidation 
in investment arbitration: how to implement consolidation across institutions 
and rules, or in other words consolidation of arbitrations brought under different 
institutional rules, or even under the same rules but with different arbitration 
seats and thus different leges arbitri.125 Obvious examples are the CME and 
Lauder cases, one, an UNCITRAL arbitration in London,126 and the other, an 
UNCITRAL arbitration in Stockholm.127
A further question that needs to be explored is whether consolidation may 
merge treaty and contract claims and, thus, do away with this distinction. This 
124 Incidentally, in view of the increasing use of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules for investment 
arbitrations, the revision is also likely to focus on other matters specifi c to investment arbitrations, among 
which fi rst and foremost transparency.
125 This question refers to the identity of the dispute resolution mechanism discussed in Section 4.4 
above.
126 Lauder v. Czech Republic, Final Award, Sept. 3, 2001, available at <http://www.investmentclaims.
com/decisions/Lauder-Czech-FinalAward-3Sept2001.pdf>, last visited June 30, 2006.
127 CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Final Award, Mar. 14, 2003, available at <http://
www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/CME-Czech-FinalAward-14Mar2003.pdf>, last visited June 30, 
2006.
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is the case under the U.S. Model BIT but apparently not under the Canadian 
Model BIT.128 Subject to the wording of any applicable treaty, the consolidation 
of claims arising out of the same state measure would appear to cover both 
treaty and contract claims, as they both arise out of the same measure or event, 
although the basis for liability or responsibility is different (contract versus 
treaty).
5.1.3 Especially, general powers of the arbitral tribunal to conduct the 
proceedings
Most national laws and institutional rules allow arbitrators to conduct 
arbitration in the manner they consider appropriate. This freedom usually is 
limited by the obligation to treat the parties fairly, respecting their equality and 
their right to be heard, and can likewise be limited by the parties’ agreement on 
the conduct of the proceedings.129
This might provide a basis for consolidation. So for instance, in one of the 
Pertamina decisions,130 the Court of Appeal of the Fifth Circuit held:
[C]ourts and arbitration tribunals have recognized that claims arising 
under integrated contracts may be consolidated into single arbitrations. 
The [arbitral] Tribunal cited one other factor that supported 
consolidation: “appropriateness.” The parties agreed to the application of 
the UNCITRAL Rules, which permit a tribunal to conduct arbitration 
‘in such manner as it considers appropriate.’
In practice, however, it is very unlikely that, in the absence of an agreement 
between the parties, a tribunal would agree to consolidate, relying only on its 
general powers to conduct the proceedings.
128 A. Crivellaro, supra note 5, p. 409.
129 See Art. 38 of the Arbitration Rules of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO 
Rules); Art. 15 of the Swiss Rules; Art. 14 of the LCIA Rules; Art. 15 of the ICC Rules; Art. 16 of the 
AAA International Arbitration Rules; Art. 15 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; Art. 19 UNCITRAL 
Model Law (ML); Section 33 of the EAA; Art. 182 of the Swiss Private International Law Act (PILA); 
Section 15 of the UAA; Art. 1042 of the German Arbitration Act (GAA).
130 Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 
274 (5th Cir. 2004).
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5.2  Who orders consolidation?
5.2.1 In commercial arbitration
Consolidation can be ordered by the courts, the arbitrators or the arbitral 
institution chosen by the parties.131 The most widespread option is for 
consolidation to be ordered by the state courts.132 Depending on the relevant 
statutes and rules, consolidation may be granted by the courts either with 
or without the parties’ consent.133 In rare cases, the power of the courts is 
absolute and exists even if the parties have agreed to rule out court-ordered 
consolidation.134
A number of objections have been raised against court-ordered consolidation. 
One of the main objections is the fact that court-ordered consolidation 
is limited to arbitral proceedings held in the country of the court ruling on 
consolidation.135 This objection fi nds support in the Dutch Arbitration Act, 
which limits consolidation to proceedings commenced in the Netherlands.
In institutional arbitration, the institution may have the power to 
consolidate, the parties giving their consent to consolidation by submitting to 
the institution’s rules.136 The power to consolidate may also be vested in the 
arbitrators, either because the parties expressly confer such power to the arbitral 
tribunal,137 or by operation of law.138 Where both courts and arbitrators have 
the power to consolidate, the issue arises of whether these powers are concurrent 
or whether one prevails.139
131 See Art. 12 of the CEPANI Rules empowering the Chairman and the Appointments Committee; 
Art. 4 of the Swiss Rules. Similarly, although it is not an arbitral institution, Art. 1126 of the EFTA 
Rules; Art. 10.25 of the CAFTA-DR; Art. 33 of the U.S. BIT Model; Art. 33 of the Uruguay-U.S. BIT; 
Art. 15.24 of the U.S.-Singapore FTA, referring to the power of the Secretary-General. However, it is 
not the Secretary-General but the tribunal established by him who will decide on the assumption of its 
jurisdiction to consolidate.
132 Section 27.2. of the BCICAA; Art. 7 of the Ontario International Commercial Arbitration Act 
(OICAA); Section 6B HKAO.
133 Art. 1046 of the NCCP. The parties can also agree to refuse such power to the courts (see Born, 
supra note 83, p. 678).
134 Chap. 251, Art. 2A of the Massachusetts General Law (MGL). See Section 10 of the UAA, 
however, which states that the prohibition agreed by the parties must be respected.
135 Intervention of B. Oppetit, in J. L. Devolvé, L’arbitrage et les tiers: III.—Le droit de l’arbitrage, 3 
Rev. Arb. 501 (1988), pp. 554 et seq.
136 E.g., Art. 4(1) of the Swiss Rules.
137 Section 35 of the EAA.
138 Particularly interesting is Section 24 of the IAA, whereby the tribunal that received the application 
communicates it to the other tribunal(s) and the tribunal(s) jointly make(s) the order.
139 See Section 21 of the BCCAA. Section 35 EAA is an interesting clause because it allows the parties 
to agree on the principle of consolidation. If the parties intend the arbitrators to rule on consolidation, 
they need to confer such power to the arbitral tribunal. Otherwise, only the courts will be empowered to 
consolidate. See also Art. 26 of the SingAA; and Section 9 of the IAICA.
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5.2.2 In investment arbitration
As previously mentioned, most investment treaties provide for a two-step 
procedure to order the consolidation of proceedings.
First, the party requesting consolidation addresses its request to a third person, 
the ICSID Secretary-General,140 or another person within the relevant institution.141 
This person’s powers are limited. Some texts, such as the NAFTA, the Canada-
Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the Japan-Mexico FTA, the Canadian Model 
BIT, require such a person to establish a tribunal whatever the circumstances. By 
contrast, under the CAFTA-DR, the U.S. Model BIT, the Uruguay-U.S. BIT, the 
U.S.-Singapore FTA, the U.S.-Morocco FTA, and the Chile-U.S. FTA, a tribunal 
is established only if the request is not manifestly unfounded.
Second, the arbitral tribunal so established decides if it assumes jurisdiction 
on all or part of the claims subject to consolidation, or if it instructs a tribunal 
previously constituted to assume jurisdiction over, hear and determine together 
all or part of the claims.142
5.3 Who resolves the consolidated cases?
5.3.1 In commercial arbitration
The solutions differ. Often the resolution of the consolidated disputes is 
entrusted to a new tribunal. This is the case under Article 1046 of the Netherlands 
Arbitration Act and Article 24 of the Australian International Arbitration Act.143 
In other texts, the question is left to the discretion of the court.144 
Whatever the contents of the applicable rule, it appears that a different 
agreement of the parties would prevail,145 for instance if they wished to submit 
140 NAFTA Art. 1126.3; Art. 10.25.2 of the CAFTA-DR; Art. 15.24.2 of the U.S.-Singapore FTA; 
Art. 33.3 of the Uruguay-U.S. BIT; Art. 10.24.2 of the U.S.-Morocco FTA; Art. 10.24.2 of the Chile-
U.S. FTA; Art. G.27.3 of the Canada-Chile FTA; Art. 83.2 of the Japan-Mexico FTA. See also Softwood 
Lumber, supra note 69, n. 156, stating that the single tribunals cease to function.
141 Art. 12.2 Annex A of the Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable 
Development of the International Institute for Sustainable Development (hereinafter IISD Model) refers 
to the “Director.”
142 Art. 10.25.6 of the CAFTA-DR; Art. 33.6 of the U.S. Model BIT; Art. 33.6 of the Uruguay-U.S. 
BIT; Art. 15.24 of the U.S.-Singapore FTA; Art. 10.23.6 of the U.S.-Morocco FTA; Art. 10.20.6 of the 
Chile-U.S. FTA. On the contrary, Art. 1126.2 NAFTA; Art. 32 of the Canada Model BIT; and Art. 83.2 
of the Japan-Mexico FTA do not provide for the possibility to instruct a tribunal already constituted to 
assume jurisdiction.
143 See also Section 2 of the NZAA; and Section 27 of the BCICAA; and Section 21 of the BCCAA.
144 See Art. 684.12 of the FIAA; and Art. 7 of the OICAA. Very recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit held that consolidation was a procedural issue for the arbitrators, not the court, to 
decide (Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau v. Century Indemnity Co. 443 F 3d 537, 577 (7 th Cir. 2006)).
145 Section 27.2 of the BCICAA; Section 21 of the BCCAA; Section 9 of the IAICA; Section of the 
24.8 AIAA.
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the consolidated case to one of the tribunals initially seized of part of the 
dispute. 
5.3.2 In investment arbitration
As mentioned above, some FTAs and BITs provide for the creation of a 
new arbitral tribunal when there is a request for consolidation. In these cases, 
and provided that the new arbitral tribunal assumes jurisdiction, it will be this 
arbitral tribunal that will hear the consolidated claims. 
In the event that the new tribunal assumes jurisdiction over all the claims, 
the initial tribunals will lose their powers to decide on the claims submitted to 
them.146 If the consolidation is only partial, they will be empowered to decide 
those claims over which the new tribunal did not assume jurisdiction.
For the sake of coordination during the consolidation process, the treaties 
provide that the consolidation tribunal may order a stay of the individual 
arbitrations pending its decision.147 In other words, the tribunal that decides 
whether to consolidate or not also rules on the consolidation disputes. It has 
been argued that such a tribunal would be biased in favor of consolidation 
because its decision might be infl uenced by a fi nancial incentive.148 As a result, 
it has been suggested that either the institution should rule on the consolidation 
or that a new tribunal should take over if the consolidation is ordered. In such 
events, the mission of the consolidation tribunal would be limited to deciding 
whether to consolidate.
Neither suggestion appears satisfactory. First, the issue of consolidation is 
too complex to be the subject of an administrative decision by the institution. 
It needs to be briefed by both parties involved, at least in writing, and possibly 
also orally, on the occasion of a hearing on consolidation. 
Second, the formation of an additional tribunal—additional to the 
consolidation tribunal and to the tribunals initially seized of the different 
disputes, which would be the fourth tribunal, at least—appears cumbersome 
and time-consuming, and can provide an opportunity for dilatory tactics. 
The position of an arbitral tribunal, having to decide whether it will 
“keep” the case or not, is not unusual. Every tribunal that rules on its own 
146 NAFTA Art. 1126.8; Art. 10.25.9 of the CAFTA-DR; Art. 15.24.9 of the U.S.-Singapore FTA; 
Art. 33.9 of the Uruguay-U.S. FTA; Art. 10.24.9 of the U.S.-Morocco FTA; Art. 10.24.9 of the Chile-
U.S. FTA; Art. G.27.8 of the Canada-Chile FTA; Art. 83.9 of the Japan-Mexico FTA.
147 NAFTA Art. 1126.9; Art. 10.25.10 of the CAFTA-DR; Art. 15.24.10 of the U.S.-Singapore 
FTA; Art. 33.10 of the Uruguay-U.S. FTA; Art. 10.24.10 of the U.S.-Morocco FTA; Art. 10.24.10 of the 
Chile-U.S. FTA; Art. G.27.9 of the Canada-Chile FTA; Art. 83.7 of the Japan-Mexico FTA.
148 In the course of colloquium discussions as well as in the Softwood Lumber proceedings. Softwood 
Lumber supra note 69, n. 82.
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jurisdiction fi nds itself in this position, and no one calls for abolishing the 
principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz. Professionalism and ethics should bring 
about an objective, bias-free assessment. In the words of the Softwood Lumber 
consolidation tribunal:
With respect to the alleged incentive for members of an Article 1126 
Tribunal, that situation is not uncommon in arbitration. Indeed, any 
arbitral tribunal that is faced with an objection to its jurisdiction would 
have the purported confl ict.149
And further:
The perceived ethical confl ict would apply to many professionals. To 
take two examples: a lawyer is to advise his or her client to bring a 
legal action; or a surgeon is to advise his or her patient about heart 
surgery. The lawyer is to advise his or her client about the strengths 
and weaknesses of the case and the chances of success; the surgeon is to 
advise the patient about the condition of the heart and the chances of 
success of the surgery. That is what the deontology of these professionals 
requires them to do. This situation basically is not any different for 
an arbitrator. He or she is to analyze the claims, and the factual and 
legal arguments in support thereof, and to make a determination in a 
professional, impartial and independent manner.150
5.4 Other practicalities of consolidation
Whatever the basis and whoever decides on consolidation, the relevant rules 
text and the consolidation decision should provide for a number of practicalities 
of consolidation. 
5.4.1 Total or partial consolidation
First, it should be decided whether the consolidation is to be total or partial. 
Certain texts expressly allow for partial consolidation,151 while others remain 
silent in this respect.152 Do the latter implicitly refer to total consolidation only 
149 Id.
150 Id. at n. 84.
151 Art. 1046 of the NCCP; NAFTA Art. 1126.2; Art. 10.25.6.of the CAFTA-DR; Art. 33.6 of the 
U.S. Model BIT; Art. 33.6 of the Uruguay-U.S. BIT; Art. 33.6 of the U.S.-Singapore FTA; Art. 32.2 of 
the Canada Model BIT; Art. 32.2 of the Canada-Chile FTA; Art. 83.8 of the Japan-Mexico FTA; Art. 
1046 of the NCCP; Section 10 of the UAA.
152 Section 24 of the AIAA; Section 9 of the IAICA; Art. 684.12 of the FIAA.
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or is partial consolidation also available in such instances? The second answer 
appears the better by way of application of the principle qui peut le plus, peut le 
moins.153
Assuming partial consolidation is available, the question arises whether 
and when partial or total consolidation should prevail. Generally speaking, 
it appears reasonable to argue that total consolidation should prevail over 
partial consolidation. The reason is that partial consolidation does not 
serve procedural effi ciency as well as total consolidation, since, with partial 
consolidation, different proceedings continue to run in parallel even after the 
consolidation.
It should be noted that partial and total consolidation are not mutually 
exclusive. They can be combined, for example, when two claimants have 
identical claims against the respondent and a third claimant shares some of 
the claims of the fi rst two and has some others of his own. The fi rst two 
cases can then be the subject of total consolidation, and the third of partial 
consolidation.
5.4.2 When to consolidate
Another question is when to consolidate. It must be answered bearing in 
mind that the primary purpose of consolidation is effi ciency, and time is a key 
to effi ciency. To protect effi ciency, should there be time limits prior to and after 
which no request for consolidation will be allowed? Because there are many 
different case confi gurations, it is diffi cult to set hard and fast rules that can 
apply in all possible circumstances. Nevertheless, a number of considerations 
can be made: 
• Because of the variety of situations, the arbitral tribunal should have the 
discretion to deny any untimely request.
• Generally, a request for consolidation should be made “at the earliest 
convenient moment: in that way, unnecessary expense and effort can be 
saved from the outset.”154
• A request for consolidation fi led before the relevant issues can be suffi ciently 
identifi ed is untimely and should be denied. This was the test used in Shui 
On, where the court held that, although the pleadings were not completed, 
the relevant issues had been suffi ciently identifi ed.155
153 See also A. Crivellaro, supra note 5, p. 402.
154 Re Shui On Construction Ltd and Schindler Lifts, supra note 42, pp. 219 et seq.
155 Id.
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• The level of progress of each case is another relevant factor. The further 
apart they are, the less likely it is that consolidation will produce effi cient 
results.156
• Whenever a jurisdictional objection is pending in one case but not in the 
others, proceedings should not be consolidated.157 The position obviously 
is different if the jurisdictional objection is common to all cases.158
• A request for consolidation fi led after the time when the tribunal has closed 
the proceedings should be deemed untimely, and denied. Otherwise, this 
may allow last minute maneuvers to delay the issuance of the decision on 
jurisdiction.
• A request fi led after the tribunal has rendered a partial award that carries res 
judicata is untimely when the partial award resolves the common issues.
5.4.3 How to conduct the consolidated proceedings
Furthermore, it will be necessary to determine how the consolidated 
proceedings will be conducted. In Softwood Lumber, the tribunal decided that 
it had discretion to determine the conduct and sequence of the consolidated 
proceedings. Obviously, this discretionary power will be exercised in consultation 
with the parties.159
In this context, a specifi c issue arises when the consolidated cases are not 
all at the same level of progress. In such an event, some of the cases may have 
to be briefed separately, while the others are stayed until the former “catch up.” 
Again, these are matters for which no hard and fast rule can be set, and which 
fall within the arbitral tribunal’s discretion.
5.4.4 The nature of the decision to consolidate
The nature of the decision to consolidate determines primarily whether the 
decision can be challenged in courts. It also determines whether the decision can 
156 Art. 4 of the Swiss Rules reads: 
When rendering its decision, the Chambers shall take into account all circumstances, including 
the links between the two cases, and the progress already made in the existing proceedings.
Article 7 of the Arbitration Rules of the Mexico Arbitration Centre reads:
[…] the parties may request the Secretary-General to join the proceedings, provided that 
the Terms of Reference have not yet been signed by the parties or approved by the General 
Council in neither of the matters.
157 It must be noted that, in Softwood Lumber, jurisdictional objections were pending and Terminal 
had not fi led its statement of claim.
158 See Art. 21.3 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, which reads as follows: 
A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than in the 
statement of defence or, with respect to a counter-claim, in the reply to the counterclaim.
159 Softwood Lumber, supra note 69, n. 153 in fi ne.
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be enforced judicially and whether it binds the arbitral tribunal that rendered 
it. If the decision is an award, it may be challenged: if it is a procedural order, 
it generally will not be subject to challenge (except possibly together with the 
fi nal award).
There is no universally accepted defi nition of an award.160 Consequently, 
there is no general agreement either on the distinction between a procedural 
order and an award.161 The New York Convention contains no helpful defi nition 
of an award,162 nor does the UNCITRAL Model Law. The Working Group 
drafting the Model Law actually had proposed a defi nition:
“Award” means a fi nal award which disposes of all issues submitted 
to the arbitral tribunal and any other decision of the arbitral tribunal 
which fi nally determines any question of substance or the question of 
its competence or any other question of procedure but, in the latter 
case, only if the arbitral tribunal terms its decision an award.163
However, the Working Group rejected this proposal because disagreement arose 
as to whether decisions on procedural issues were to be considered awards.164 
For present purposes, we suggest using a more nuanced defi nition, pursuant to 
which an award is a fi nal decision by the arbitrators on all or part of the dispute 
submitted to them, whether it concerns the merits of the dispute, jurisdiction, 
or a procedural request which seeks to end the proceedings.165 In other words, 
decisions dealing with a procedural matter, for example, a res judicata defense, 
are awards whenever they put an end to the proceedings or whenever they would 
have done so, but for the denial of the procedural request or defense. 
By contrast, procedural orders are decisions intended to organize the 
procedure. They are based solely on the tribunal’s powers to conduct the 
160 Redfern/Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, (2004), p. 353; Lew/
Mistelis/Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Law,(2003), p. 628.
161 Redfern/Hunter, supra note 160, pp. 354–356; Poudret/Besson, Droit comparé de l’arbitrage 
international (2002), pp. 676–683, both with discussion of cases.
162 Art. I.2 NYC reads as follows: “The term ‘arbitral awards’ shall include not only awards made by 
arbitrators appointed for each case but also those made by permanent arbitral bodies to which the parties 
have submitted.”
163 A. Broches, Recourse Against the Award; Enforcement of the Award, UNCITRAL’s project for 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, ICCA Congress Series No. 2 (1984), p. 208. A/
CN.9/246, § 192.
164 A/CN.9/246, para. 192 et seq.
165  Poudret/Besson, supra note 161, pp. 678 et seq. with citations to cases; see also Fouchard/
Gaillard/Goldmann, On International Commercial Arbitration (1999), para. 1353.
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arbitration proceedings.166 In other terms, what ultimately matters is the 
function of the decision.167
This being so, it obviously is the law governing the arbitration that will 
determine whether a decision is an award or a procedural order. Thus, one 
should be aware that such law may show variations from the general defi nitions 
just set out.
On the basis of these general defi nitions and of the developments on 
consolidation made earlier, let us now determine the nature of the decision to 
consolidate. Doing so, the following points can be made:
• First, a distinction must be made based on the author of the decision. If 
it is an arbitral institution, the decision necessarily will be administrative 
in nature. Only if the decision is made by an arbitral tribunal does the 
question arises whether it is an award or a procedural order.
• Further, one should note that the treaties dealing with consolidation use 
the term “consolidation order.”168 Acting under the NAFTA, the Softwood 
Lumber tribunal characterized consolidation as an “action of a procedurally 
administrative nature, in which two or more arbitral tribunals are replaced 
by one arbitral tribunal with respect to the same disputes.”169
• Moreover, bearing in mind the defi nition of the term “award” adopted 
above, it goes without saying that the decision to consolidate is not a 
decision on the merits. It is not a decision on jurisdiction either. Its purpose 
is not to decide on the validity and scope of the arbitration agreement.170 
166 K-P. Berger, International Economic Arbitration (1993), p. 592; Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, supra note 
160, para. 24–5; Redfern/Hunter, supra note 160, p. 354. ICSID Arbitration Rule 20 provides for a non-
exhaustive list of procedural matters. Procedural decisions may be modifi ed since they carry no res judicata 
effect and do not bind the arbitrators. S. Jarvin, To What Extent Are Procedural Decisions of Arbitrators 
Subject to Court Review?, 9 ICCA Congress series 366 (1999), p. 368; R. Trittmann, When Should 
Arbitrators Issue Interim or Partial Awards and or Procedural Orders?, 20 J. Int’l Arb. 255 (2003), p. 260; 
Poudret/Besson, supra note 161, para. 542.
167 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, supra note 160, para. 24–12.
168 See NAFTA Art. 1126.2; Art. 33.1 of the U.S. Model BIT; Art. 10.25 of the CAFTA-DR; Art. 
83.1 of the Japan-Mexico FTA; Art. 33 of the Uruguay-U.S. Model BIT; Art. 15.24 of the U.S.-Singapore 
FTA; Art. 32 of the Canada Model BIT; Art. G-27.2 of the Canada-Chile FTA; Section 6b.1lit. c of the 
HKAO.
169 Softwood Lumber, supra note 69, n. 100.
170 So, for instance, “the question of consolidation does not affect an analysis of the validity or scope 
of this arbitration.” Blimpie Int’l, Inc. v. Blimpie of the Keys, 371 F. Supp. 2d 469 (D.N.Y. 2005). See 
also Shaw’s Supermarkets Inc. v. United Food & Commer. Workers Union, Local 791, 321 F.3d 251 (1st 
Cir. 2003).
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That latter decision is made either before or after the consolidation by the 
tribunal(s) then in charge.171 The fact that Article 1126(2) of the NAFTA 
uses the words “assume jurisdiction” is no indication to the contrary. Such 
language simply is meant to say “that the Article 1126 [consolidation] 
Tribunal takes over the proceedings, in the capacity of an arbitral tribunal, 
to hear and determine the disputes from the respective Article 1120 [initial] 
Tribunals.”172
• As an additional possible classifi cation, one may ask whether the decision to 
consolidate is a decision on the regularity or validity of the constitution of 
the arbitral tribunal. Under certain legal regimes, such decisions are awards 
subject to challenge.173 This classifi cation would not refl ect the true nature 
of the decision to consolidate. When determining whether to consolidate 
or not, the tribunal does not review the constitution of the earlier tribunals. 
It relies on very different considerations involving effi ciency, commonality 
and due process.
• Still bearing in mind the defi nition of an award given earlier, the decision 
on consolidation does not put an end to the proceedings and is not capable 
of doing so. If it dismisses the request, the proceedings continue separately. 
If it grants the request, the proceedings continue jointly. In other terms, 
they continue in any event. 
• As a result, one cannot but conclude that the decision to consolidate is an 
order not subject to challenge. This conclusion is in line with a number of 
U.S. court decisions.174 
Because of the signifi cant consequences it may have on the proceedings, 
the consolidation decision should be subject to certain safeguards. It should be 
taken by the tribunal as a whole by a majority vote,175 not by the president of 
the tribunal only, as is sometimes done for procedural orders. Equally, decisions 
on consolidation should be reasoned, unlike certain procedural orders. Finally, 
171 Softwood Lumber, supra note 69, n. 101.
172 Id.
173 E.g., for Switzerland, Art. 190 para. 2 lit. a of the PILA; Berti/Schnyder, Article 190, in S. Berti 
(ed.), International Arbitration in Switzerland (2000), p. 575; see also Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, supra note 160, 
paras. 25–35. See Art. 1502 of the NCPC; Section 67 of the EAA.
174 See decisions cited in note 170.
175 This idea is supported by F. Poudret and S. Besson, who consider that when there is no mention 
of the lex arbitri or the agreement of the parties, an arbitral tribunal shall decide on procedural issues by 
majority. Poudret/Besson, supra note 161, para. 543.
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unless the rules or the parties provide otherwise, orders on consolidation cannot 
be modifi ed.176 
5.4.5 “Deconsolidation” and miscellaneous other matters
If after consolidation has been ordered, the consolidated proceedings turn 
out to be ineffi cient or inappropriate under the circumstances, should there be 
a possibility to undo the consolidation, or rather to “deconsolidate”? Subject 
to some exceptions,177 the current texts on consolidation do not provide for 
such a possibility. If the consolidation is briefed and decided properly, potential 
ineffi ciencies should be identifi ed at the time of the decision on consolidation, 
and not discovered later. As a result, a situation where deconsolidation is 
warranted appears rather theoretical. If a provision on deconsolidation is, 
nevertheless, deemed useful, it should be designed in such a fashion that it does 
not open the door to dilatory tactics.
Finally, for the sake of completeness, it should also be determined whether 
the consolidated tribunal must render several separate awards or a single 
consolidated award, and whether all parties must participate in annulment 
proceedings if only one party fi les an action for the annulment of a consolidated 
award. 
6. CONSOLIDATION IN THE PRACTICE OF OTHER               
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS
Consolidation is also part of the practice of other dispute settlement 
mechanisms. Such is the case of the International Court of Justice, the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and the Dispute Settlement Body 
of the World Trade Organization. The three are inter-state dispute settlement 
bodies.178 They will be examined in turn.
176 Softwood Lumber, Procedural Order No. 2, Jan. 10, 2006: “The Consolidation Order does not 
have the same legal status and effect as a procedural order referred to in Section 20 of Procedural Order 
No. 1, which can be varied if circumstances so require....” It must be pointed out that on Feb. 17, 2006, 
Tembec fi led a motion to vacate the decision on consolidation as an award, <http://www.state.gov/s/l/
c17639.htm>, last visited July 17, 2006.
177 Art. 7.7 of the Arbitration Rules (2000 Edition) of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators and 
Rule 3.11 of the Construction Industry Model Arbitration Rules are exceptions allowing the tribunal to 
revoke the consolidation order. See also Art. 12.5 of the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational 
Civil Procedure, allowing separation of claims for fair and effi cient management.
178 One has to note that the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the ITLOS also has jurisdiction with 
respect to disputes between the International Seabed Authority and a prospective contractor, and disputes 
between a State and the International Seabed Authority.
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6.1 The International Court of Justice
Joinder or consolidation of disputes was not mentioned in the Rules of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) until 1936.179 The ICJ 
drafted its Rules (Rules of Court) in 1946, the year it was established. The 1946 
Rules of Court were mostly inspired by the PCIJ’s Rules of 1936.180 In 1978, a 
revision of the Rules of Court resulted in the incorporation of a new provision, 
Article 47, which deals specifi cally with consolidation of cases and procedures, 
or rather the authority for the ICJ to convert multiple and separate proceedings 
into a single proceeding. The effect of Article 47 is that single pleadings are fi led 
subsequently, leading to a single judgment. Article 47 of the Rules of Court 
constitutes a codifi cation of the practice developed by both the PCIJ and the 
ICJ with regard to consolidation.181
6.1.1 Practice of the PCIJ and the ICJ with regard to consolidation
At the PCIJ, consolidation was promoted on the one hand based on the will 
of the parties to a dispute and, on the other hand, proprio motu and ex offi cio 
by the Court itself in exercising its compétence de la compétence. An example of 
the fi rst situation is an agreement between the parties to join, for the purpose 
of proceedings on the merits, two actions initiated successively by one party 
179 From 1936, joinder was foreseen in the Rules of the PCIJ as what we may call “joinder of incidental 
proceedings to the proceedings per se before the Court.” Only two mechanisms of consolidation were 
foreseen. Article 62 of the Rules opened the way to the joinder of preliminary objections to the merits, 
and Article 63 provided for the joinder to the original proceedings of a case instituted by counter-claim. 
According to Rosenne, these types of joinder constitute “two specifi c types of joinder,” see Sh. Rosenne, 
The Law and Practice of the International Court (1985), p. 551. For a discussion on the notion of 
“joinder of preliminary objection to the merits,” see Sir G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the 
International Court of Justice, vol. II, (1986), pp. 782 et seq.
180 In 1972, the ICJ amended its Rules and the fi rst possibility—joinder of preliminary objections 
to the merits—was dropped while the second—joinder of counter-claims to original proceedings—was 
retained in what is Article 80 of the Rules of Court. The latter was amended in 2001. Paragraph 3 of 
Article 80 covers the same ground as former paragraph 3, but is worded differently and omits the provision 
that the Court shall “decide whether or not the question thus presented shall be joined to the original 
proceedings,” and replaces it with the more general clause that the Court “shall take its decision thereon.” 
This amendment reveals the fact that joinder of incidental proceedings to the proceedings per se before the 
Court no longer constitutes a main feature and characteristic of consolidation in the Rules of Court.
181 According to Rosenne, “The common feature of the instances of joinder so far encountered is that 
the separate proceedings all dealt with the same general situation and had so much in common that their 
continuation as separate cases would have been inconvenient and otiose.” See Sh. Rosenne, The Law and 
Practice of the International Court 1920–1996, vol. III (1997), p. 1256.
2 Consolidated Report 3-5-07.indd   104 3/5/07   12:50:08 PM
CONSOLIDATION OF PROCEEDINGS IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 105
against another party.182 The said agreement does not need to be formal and 
explicit; it can be presumed, as was the case in the South-Eastern Greenland 
case.183
Illustrations of such a presumed agreement include a situation in which 
each party had fi led an application instituting proceedings against the other 
on the same day regarding the same matter,184 and one in which preliminary 
objections to two separate applications fi led by a state have been joined by the 
Court.185
The ICJ has also dealt with other types of circumstances, such as several 
parties instituting proceedings against a single state arising out of the same or 
similar facts,186 or one party fi ling a claim against more than one state arising 
out of a single set of facts.187 In practice, the issue of the joinder or consolidation 
of cases has often arisen in connection with the appointment of judges ad hoc.188 
182 See Case concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Judgment of Feb. 5, 1925, 
PCIJ Ser. A, No.7 (1926), p. 6: “In the additional Application fi led on the same day on behalf of the 
German Government, the latter […] requested the Court to join that Application to the Application 
fi led on May 15th, 1925. By a decision dated February 5th, 1926, the Court complied with this request” 
See also id. “Decision concerning the Joinder of the Two Suits Introduced Successively by the German 
Government,” Annex I, p. 94: “The Court […] duly records the agreement reached between the Parties 
in regard to the joinder of the proceedings instituted by the German Government against the Polish 
Government on May 15th and August 25th, 1925.”
183 See Legal Status of the South-Eastern Greenland, PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 48 (1932), p. 270: 
[…] Whereas the situation in which the Court has to deal closely approximates, so far as 
concerns the procedure, to that which would arise if a special agreement had been submitted to it 
by the two Governments, parties to the dispute, indicating the subject of the dispute and the 
differing claims of the Parties; Whereas, in any case, the two applications should be joined 
and the two applicant Governments held to be simultaneously in the position of Applicant 
and Respondent. (Emphasis added)
184 See Legal Status of the South-Eastern Greenland, PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 48 (1932), p. 270: 
[…] Whereas it follows that both the Norwegian and Danish applications are directed to 
the same object […] Whereas, in any case, the two applications should be joined and the 
two applicant Governments held to be simultaneously in the position of Applicant and 
Respondent. (Emphasis added)
185 See Appeals from certain Judgments of the Hungaro-Czechoslovak Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, 
PCIJ Ser. A/B, No.56 (1933), p. 163: “Having regard to the Order of October 26th, 1932, whereby the 
Court joined the preliminary objections lodged in the two suits and fi xed a time-limit within which the 
Czechoslovak Government might submit a written statement in regard to these objections.”
186 See South West Africa, ICJ Reports 1961, p. 14. 
187 See Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 19.
188 See G. Guyomar, Commentaire du Règlement de la Cour internationale de Justice: Interprétation 
et pratique (1983), pp. 300 et seq. According to the author: “Il est certain que la désignation de juges ad hoc 
lorsque les parties sont considérées comme faisant cause commune et la jonction d’instance, constituent 
deux hypothèses différentes qui ne se présentent pas nécessairement ensemble. C’est un des mérites du 
nouveau Règlement [de 1978] que de faire clairement cette distinction.”
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For instance, in the South West Africa cases, in dealing with the question of the 
appointment of a single judge ad hoc by the two applicants, the ICJ joined the 
two sets of proceedings, with the effect that thereafter single pleadings were fi led 
and a single judgment delivered in each phase.189 As can be noted, the above-
mentioned procedure, called de facto consolidation in the fi eld of commercial 
and investment arbitration, also plays a role in the consolidation of cases at the 
ICJ.
The issue of consolidation of cases or procedures before the ICJ has recently 
re-emerged in another form. Indeed in 1998, the ICJ announced a change in 
its working methods, stating that it would start considering some cases “back 
to back.”190 The rationale behind such a revision of its working procedures 
was to allow the ICJ to expedite the examination of contentious cases brought 
before it, but also to deal with the major increase in the Court’s activity and 
the budgetary constraints it faces as a result of the fi nancial crisis of the United 
Nations. One of the measures adopted by the ICJ opens the door for what can 
be termed a “soft consolidation” of jurisdiction-related cases: 
When the Court has to adjudicate on two cases concerning its jurisdiction, 
it will be able to hear them “back to back” (that is to say, in immediate 
succession), so that work may then proceed on them concurrently. This 
innovation will be undertaken on an experimental basis, where there are 
appropriate cases and a pressing need to proceed rapidly.191 
The concept of soft consolidation is referred to because in this situation the 
intent is neither to proceed to a formal joinder of cases (which would result, 
189 See South West Africa cases, ICJ Reports 1961, pp. 14 et seq. The Court gave the following 
reasons: 
Whereas all Governments which, in proceedings before the Court, come to the same 
conclusion, must be held in the same interest; Whereas the submissions set out in the 
Applications are mutatis mutandis identical, and the texts of Applications themselves are, 
except in few minor respects, identical; Whereas the submissions set out in the Memorials 
are mutatis mutandis identical, and the texts of the Memorials themselves are, except in 
few minor respects, identical; Whereas, accordingly, for the purposes of the present case, 
the Governments of Ethiopia and Liberia are in the same interest before the Court and 
therefore, so far as the choice of a Judge ad hoc is concerned, to be reckoned as one party 
only […] The Court joins the proceedings instituted by the Applications of the Government 
of Ethiopia and the Government of Liberia; Finds that the Government of Ethiopia and the 
Government of Liberia are in the same interest.
190 See ICJ Yearbook 1998 and Press Release 98/14 available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
ipresscom/iPress1998/ipr9814.html>, last visited July 14, 2006.
191 Id.
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for instance, in the rendering of a single judgment) as foreseen in Article 47 of 
the Rules of Court, nor to extend such a “back to back” rationale to all phases 
of the procedure before the ICJ, such as admissibility, merits and the hearing of 
witnesses, as is also provided for by Article 47 of the Rules of Court.
This soft consolidation practice was followed by the ICJ in the Application 
of the 1971 Montreal Convention cases. In those cases, the applicant fi led two 
separate applications and requests against two respondents. Opening the oral 
proceedings in the provisional measures phase, the President of the ICJ stated:
For reasons of convenience, and after consultation with the Governments 
concerned, it has been decided that Libya, which is the Applicant and 
the State requesting provisional measures, will address the Court fi rst, 
on the requests presented in both cases, and that will be followed by 
the United Kingdom in the case Libya v. United Kingdom and then 
by the United States in the case Libya v. United States. These practical 
arrangements are without prejudice to any decision the Court may 
subsequently take, under Article 47 of the Rules of Court, to join the 
proceedings in the two cases at any time or to direct common action in 
any respect in these proceedings.192 
Therefore, the notion of consolidation in the ICJ’s practice covers various 
concepts. Some scholars like Rosenne consider that consolidation and joinder 
are not interchangeable terms. He argues that in the light of the cumulative 
experience of both the PCIJ and the ICJ, it is more appropriate to limit the 
term joinder to those instances in which a single judgment is to be given despite 
the initial multiplicity of proceedings.193 Another point to be made is that it 
is commonly agreed that consolidation of cases should be distinguished from 
intervention in the proceedings of the ICJ. The Statute of the ICJ provides 
for two different types of interventions, namely intervention in a case where 
the decision in question may affect an interest of a legal nature of the state 
seeking to intervene (Article 62 of the Statute) and intervention in a case where 
the construction of a convention is in question (Article 63 of the Statute).194 
Intervention is different from consolidation, given the fact that intervention 
192 See CR 92/2, p. 15, Mar. 26, 1992 (emphasis added), quoted by Sh. Rosenne, supra note 181, p. 
1258.
193 Id. p. 1259.
194 The two provisions are supplemented by Articles 81–85 of the 1978 Rules of the Court.
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does not lead the intervenor to become a party to the dispute.195 Thus, the 
intervenor is much more like a “third party” to a dispute rather than a party to 
a consolidated dispute.
6.1.2 The power of the ICJ in consolidating cases and procedures
Article 47 of the Rules of Court does not require the prior consent of states 
parties to a dispute for the Court to join cases.196 However, in practice, the ICJ 
has established a long tradition of taking into account the parties’ opinions and 
wishes before deciding whether or not to consolidate disputes. For example, 
this was the situation in the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, where two separate 
applications were brought against Iceland challenging the international validity 
of Icelandic legislation on the limits of fi sheries. When the case reached the 
merits phase, the Court assessed the wishes of the parties with regard to a 
possible joinder of the two cases. Given the objection of the two applicants, the 
Court decided not to join the cases.197
Even if the Court is willing to take into consideration opinions and views of 
the parties, it has the discretionary power to decide whether or not to consolidate 
cases. The exercise of such a discretionary power may lead to dissenting 
opinions from some of the judges. This is what occurred at the provisional 
measures stage in the Nuclear Tests cases. Some judges dissented because they 
considered that a joinder was justifi ed in light of the close connection between 
the questions of law and fact raised by the Australian and the New Zealand 
195 See Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), 
Judgment of Sept. 11, 1992, ICJ Reports 1992, para. 421.
196 See North Sea Continental Shelf, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 19: 
By a tripartite Protocol […] it was provided […] b) that the Parties would ask the Court 
to join the two cases ; c) that for the purpose of the appointment of a judge ad hoc, the 
Kingdom of Denmark and the Netherlands should be considered as being in the same 
interest […] Following upon these communications, duly made to it in the implementation 
of the Protocol, the Court, by an Order dated 26 April 1968, declared Denmark and the 
Netherlands to be in the same interest, and joined the proceedings in the two cases.
197 See Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 177: 
[…] the Agent of the Federal Republic of Germany submitted the observations of his 
Government on the question of the possible joinder of the two Fisheries Jurisdiction cases. 
The Government of Iceland was informed that the observations of the Federal Republic 
on possible joinder had been invited, but did not make any comments to the Court […] 
The Court decided not to join the present proceedings to those instituted by the United 
Kingdom against the Republic of Iceland. In reaching this decision the Court took into 
account the fact that while the basic legal issues in each case appeared to be identical, there 
were differences between the positions of the two Applicants, and between their respective 
submissions, and that joinder would be contrary to the wishes of the two Applicants.
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claims, the identity of the object of the claim, and the identity of the litigant 
cited as respondent.198
Article 47 of the Rules of Court takes into account many eventualities, 
including formal joinder of proceedings leading to a single judgment (of 
which the operative clauses may be different), or the consolidation of separate 
proceedings from the point of view of the logical ordering of the hearings. This 
latter aspect of consolidation is illustrated in the Legality of use of force cases 
where Serbia and Montenegro brought an action against eight NATO member 
states. Indeed, the Court decided that a formal joinder of the proceedings would 
not be appropriate at the stage of the preliminary objections, even though it 
held public hearings simultaneously in the eight cases. 
Although Article 47 of the Rules of Court seems broad in scope, consolidation 
of proceedings before the ICJ is not synonymous with the substantive and 
procedural “homogenization” of cases. Indeed, when dealing with the joinder of 
proceedings, the Court is guided by a certain standard of scrutiny in delineating 
the objective scope of each dispute. Such an approach is noticeable in the Aerial 
Incident of 27 July 1955 cases.199 Each of the cases, instituted by Israel, the 
United States and the United Kingdom against Bulgaria, arose out of a single 
set of facts. However, the titles of jurisdiction invoked were different, as well 
as the subjects of the claims and the grounds on which the claims were based. 
According to Rosenne, “no question of joinder arose, and it seems that the 
applicant governments did not wish for a single judgment to be rendered in the 
case on the merits.”200
The rather careful approach of the Court is more explicit in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf case where the Court stated: 
Although the proceedings have thus been joined, the cases themselves 
remain separate, at least in the sense that they relate to different areas of 
the North Sea continental shelf, and that there is no a priori reason why 
the Court must reach identical conclusions in regard to them,—if for 
instance geographical features present in the one case were not present 
in the other. At the same time, the legal arguments presented on behalf 
of Denmark and the Netherlands, both before and since the joinder, 
198 See Nuclear Tests, Interim Protection, Order of June 22, 1973, ICJ Reports 1973, dissenting 
opinion of Judge Forster, p. 148; dissenting opinion of Judge Gros, p. 149; and dissenting opinion of 
Judge Ignacio-Pinto, p. 163. 
199 See Case concerning the Aerial Incident of July 27, 1955, Order of Nov. 26, 1957, ICJ Reports 
1957, p. 182, p. 186 and p. 190.
200 Sh. Rosenne, supra note 179, p. 552.
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have been substantially identical, apart from certain matters of detail, 
and have been presented either in common or in close co-operation. To 
this extent therefore, the two cases may be treated as one.201 
6.2 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
Article 47 of the Rules of the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea enables the Tribunal to decide that the proceedings in two or more cases 
be joined. The provision also enables the Tribunal to decide that the written 
or oral proceedings are in common without establishing any formal joinder. 
The possibility of the Tribunal limiting consolidation to only certain parts of 
the proceedings—for instance, the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility—
provides some fl exibility for the different positions of the parties. Thus, a 
distinction can be made between “formal consolidation” or “total consolidation” 
of cases and “informal consolidation” or “partial consolidation” of cases.202 
The situations contemplated by Article 47 arise when two or more parties 
bring cases against the same party on the basis of the same facts and where a 
party submits cases against two or more parties on the basis of the same facts.203 
Like Article 47 of the Rules of the ICJ, Article 47 of the Rules of ITLOS foresees 
both consolidation of cases with multiple complainants and consolidation of 
cases with multiple defendants.
Article 47 of the Rules of the ITLOS was used once—in the Southern Bluefi n 
Tuna cases. In July 1999, New Zealand and Australia fi led Requests for the 
prescription of provisional measures in their dispute with Japan concerning 
Southern Bluefi n Tuna. New Zealand’s request was received fi rst and was entered 
in the List of Cases as Case No. 3. Australia’s request was subsequently entered in 
the List of cases as Case No. 4. The consolidation procedure contained in Article 
47 of the Rules of the ITLOS allowed the two cases to be joined and listed as the 
Southern Bluefi n Tuna (Requests for provisional measures) Cases. It is interesting 
to note that the ITLOS used a specifi c Order to join proceedings in this case.204
It is uncertain whether the ITLOS would have joined the proceedings 
without the explicit or implicit consent of the parties. This doubt arises from 
the fact that, in its Order, the Tribunal emphasized that in their Requests for the 
prescription of provisional measures, New Zealand and Australia stated that they 
201 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 196, p. 19.
202 It can be noted that this distinction may also apply to Article 47 of the Rules of Court since that 
provision contains the same language as Article 47 of the ITLOS Rules.
203 See G. Eiriksson, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (2000), p. 160.
204 See Southern Bluefi n Tuna Cases, Order of Aug. 16, 1999. The ICJ issued a special Order to join 
cases in the South West Africa Cases, op. cit., ICJ Reports 1961, pp. 13–15.
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appeared as “parties in the same interest.” Even if the wording of Article 47 of the 
Rules of the ITLOS suggests some kind of a “discretionary power” to consolidate 
disputes, one may legitimately conclude that, similarly to the ICJ, the ITLOS is 
inclined to take due consideration of and give appropriate weight to the wishes 
of the parties. Incidentally, in one of its orders, the ITLOS showed expressis verbis 
that one legal consequence of the consolidation of proceedings—the fi ling by 
Japan of a single Statement in response to Australia and New Zealand—derives 
from Article 47 of the Rules and from the “consent” of Australia and New 
Zealand that Japan may fi le a single Statement in response.205
The possibility of joining a counterclaim to the original proceedings is 
another feature of consolidation contemplated in Article 98(3) of the Rules of 
the ITLOS. The possibility for a party to a dispute to present a counterclaim 
to the claim of the other party is generally seen as an incidental proceeding. 
The condition for this type of consolidation is that the counter-claim is directly 
connected to the subject-matter of the claim. If there is a doubt as to the 
connection between the issue presented by way of counterclaim and the subject-
matter of the claim, the Tribunal shall decide whether or not the question shall be 
joined to the original proceedings. Before making its decision, the Tribunal shall 
hear the parties. The ITLOS has broad power to decide whether to consolidate 
incidental proceedings with original proceedings. Unlike the Rules of the ICJ,206 
the concept of “joinder” with regard to consolidation of counterclaims to the 
original proceedings has remained in the Rules of the ITLOS.207
6.3 The Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization 
The power to decide whether to establish a “consolidated” panel rests with 
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which is composed of representatives of 
all WTO members.208 At the panel stage, a party can raise as a preliminary 
205 See Southern Bluefi n Tuna Cases, Order of Aug. 27, 1999, para. 17: “Whereas, by a letter dated 
6 August 1999, the parties were informed that the President, acting in accordance with Article 47 of the 
Rules and with the consent of Australia and New Zealand, had directed that Japan might fi le a single 
Statement in Response by 9 August 1999.”
206 See supra note 180.
207 See Article 98(3) of the ITLOS Rules: “In the event of doubt as to the connection between the 
question presented by way of counter-claim and the subject-matter of the claim of the other party the 
Tribunal shall, after hearing the parties, decide whether or not the question thus presented shall be joined 
to the original proceedings.”
208 The General Council discharges its responsibilities with respect to dispute settlement through 
the Dispute Settlement Body which is composed of representatives of all WTO Members. The DSB is 
responsible for administering the DSU. The DSB has the authority to establish panels, adopt panel and 
Appellate Body reports, maintain surveillance of implementation of rulings or recommendations of panels 
or of the Appellate Body and authorize suspension of concessions or other obligations under the WTO 
agreements.
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objection the issue of whether the panel’s jurisdiction was properly established 
by the DSB.
One also has to bear in mind that a rather exceptional decision-making 
procedure is followed by the DSB at four key stages in the dispute settlement 
process: establishment of the panel, adoption of the panel and Appellate Body 
reports, and authorization of suspension of concessions and other obligations 
covered by the WTO agreements. At these stages, the decision is taken to accept 
the request for the establishment of a panel or adopt the report unless there is 
a consensus against it. The rule of “negative consensus” on these matters makes 
decision-making quasi-automatic. This contrasts sharply with the situation that 
prevailed under GATT 1947, when reports of panels could only be adopted on 
the basis of consensus. Unlike GATT 1947, the DSU provides no opportunity 
for blocking in decision-making. That is to say that, whenever the DSB decides to 
establish a “consolidated” panel, no party to a dispute can oppose its decision. 
The procedure for consolidating disputes under the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU) is rather formalized. Article 9 of the DSU 
provides that, where more than one WTO Member requests a panel related to 
the “same matter,” a single panel should be established whenever feasible.209 The 
panel must organize its examination and present its fi ndings in such a manner 
that the rights that the disputants would have enjoyed, had separate panels been 
appointed, are in no way impaired. Article 9.1 provides for complaints to be 
joined where they deal with “the same matter.” A matter is defi ned as a specifi c 
set of facts with a specifi c set of claims for a specifi c member. 210 
Article 9.1 of the DSU is recommendatory and not mandatory. As explained 
by the panel in India-Patents (EC),
[g]iven their ordinary meaning, the terms of Article 9.1 are directory 
or recommendatory, not mandatory. They direct that a single panel 
should (not “shall”) be established, and that direction is limited to cases 
where it is feasible […] Article 9.1 is clearly a code of conduct for the 
DSB because its provisions pertain to the establishment of a panel, the 
authority for which is exclusively reserved for the DSB. As such, Article 9.1 
209 If separate disputes are consolidated, there are common terms of reference. If one dispute has 
already been established with its own terms of reference, it is still possible for these terms to be revised 
when a new party is joined as complainant.
210 In the context of WTO dispute settlement, the notion of “matter,” as referred to in Article 7.1 of 
the DSU, determines the scope of what is submitted, and what can be ruled upon, by a panel. As confi rmed 
by the Appellate Body in the Guatemala—Cement case, the matter referred to the Dispute Settlement 
Body consists of two elements: the specifi c measures at issue and the legal basis of the complaint (or the 
claims). See Appellate Body Report, Guatemala—Cement I, para. 72.
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should not affect substantive and procedural rights and obligations of 
individual Members under the DSU.211 
6.3.1 “Semi-consolidation” in the DSU
If more than one panel is established by the DSB to examine the complaints 
related to the “same matter,” Article 9.3 of the DSU provides that to the greatest 
extent possible they should have common panelists and harmonized timetables. 
Article 9.3 of the DSU is an “incentive” for the consolidation of cases. Indeed, 
even if there is no formal joinder of cases or procedures relating to the same 
matter (as permitted by Article 9.1 of the DSU), it is compulsory to have the 
same panelists on each of the separate established panels. Article 9.3 is clearly a 
path for the strengthening of the principle of res judicata and the coherence in 
adjudication. 
Article 9.3 of the DSU was implemented, for instance, in the Hormones 
case. The complaint of Canada and that of the United States were reviewed by 
two separate panels composed of the same individuals. In that case, the issue of 
consolidation with regard to “harmonized timetables” was objected to by the 
European Communities (EC). More specifi cally, the EC appealed the panel’s 
decision to hold a joint meeting with scientifi c experts, to give the United States 
and Canada access to all information submitted in both proceedings, and to 
invite the United States. to participate and make a Statement at the second 
substantive meeting in the proceeding where Canada was the complaining 
party. The Appellate Body rejected the EC’s objection. In relation to holding 
one joint meeting with scientifi c experts, the Appellate Body considered that 
the decision to hold a joint meeting with the scientifi c experts is consistent with 
the letter and spirit of Article 9.3 of the DSU. The Appellate Body mentioned 
the “uneconomical use of time and resources” had the panel been forced to hold 
two successive but separate meetings gathering the same group of experts twice, 
expressing their views twice regarding the same scientifi c and technical matters 
related to the same contested EC measures.212 
6.3.2 Consolidating procedures without eliminating the possibility of 
multiple reports 
The possibility of consolidation at the WTO does not imply that a panel will 
render a single report in cases that have been joined. If requested by a party to 
the consolidated disputes, the panel must submit separate reports that may have 
211 See Panel Report, India-Patents (EC), para. 7.14 (emphasis added). 
212 See Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, paras. 152–153.
2 Consolidated Report 3-5-07.indd   113 3/5/07   12:50:10 PM
114 ICSID REVIEW—FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW JOURNAL
identical parts (Article 9.2 of the DSU).213 One of the objectives of Article 9 is 
to ensure that the respondent is not later faced with a demand for compensation 
or threatened by retaliation with respect to matters not complained of by one 
of the complaining parties.214 If a complainant has not raised a claim at the 
appropriate stage, the panel report related to that complainant should refl ect 
that fact.215 
The right to ask for separate reports is guided by the principles of 
predictability and legal certainty. The Appellate Body in U.S.-Offset Act (Byrd 
Amendment) noted that although the text of Article 9.2 of the DSU contains 
no requirement for the request for a separate panel report to be made “by a 
certain time,” it does not explicitly provide that such requests may be made 
“at any time.”216 The Appellate Body went on to observe that Article 9.2 must 
not be read in isolation from other provisions of the DSU and without taking 
into account the overall object and purpose of that Agreement as expressed in 
Article 3.3 of the DSU, the “prompt settlement of disputes.”217 On this basis, 
the Appellate Body concluded that the right contained in Article 9.2 is not 
unqualifi ed and, in particular, it cannot justify a request for a separate panel 
report “at any time during the panel proceedings.”218 
In practice, WTO panels have used different methods of consolidation with 
regard to the issuance of reports. For instance, in EC-Bananas III, the European 
Communities requested the panel to prepare four panel reports—one each 
for the claims of Ecuador, Guatemala and Honduras (who fi led a joint fi rst 
submission), Mexico and the United States. The panel agreed and issued four 
separate reports with identical descriptive parts but with fi ndings sections that 
differed according to the claims of the various respondents: 
[W]e have decided that the description of the Panel’s proceedings, the 
factual aspects and the parties’ arguments should be identical in the 
213 In EC-Bananas III, the Panel interpreted Art. 9.2 of the DSU to mean that it is obliged to “comply 
with such a request.” See Panel Report, EC-Bananas III, para. 7.57.
214 See Panel Report, EC-Bananas III, para. 7.56: 
In our view, one of the objectives of Art. 9 is to ensure that a respondent is not later faced 
with a demand for compensation or threatened by retaliation under Art. 22 of the DSU in 
respect of uncured inconsistencies with WTO rules that were not complained of by one 
of the complaining parties participating in a panel proceeding. Our reports must bear this 
objective in mind.
215 See Panel Report, EC- Bananas III, paras. 7.55–7.58.
216 See Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 310.
217 Id. para. 311.
218 Id.
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four reports. In the “Findings” section, however, the reports differ to the 
extent that the Complainants’ initial written submissions to the Panel 
differ in respect of alleging inconsistencies with the requirements of 
specifi c provisions of specifi c agreements.219
In U.S.-Steel Safeguards, in accordance with the request by the United States 
to issue separate reports, the panel issued its reports in the form of one document 
comprising eight panel reports. The document included a common cover page, 
descriptive part and fi ndings, but individualized conclusions:
In exercising our “margin of discretion” under Article 9.2 of the DSU, 
and taking into account the particularities of this dispute, the Panel 
decides to issue its Reports in the form of one document constituting 
eight Panel Reports. For WTO purposes, this document is deemed to 
be eight separate reports, each of the reports relating to each one of the 
eight complainants in this dispute. The document comprises a common 
cover page and a common Descriptive Part. This refl ects the fact that 
the eight steel safeguard disputes were reviewed through a single panel 
process. This single document also contains a common set of Findings 
in relation to each of the claims that the Panel has decided to address. 
In our exercise of judicial economy, we have mainly addressed the 
complainants’ common claims and on that basis, we were able to issue a 
common set of Findings which, we believed, resolved the dispute. Finally, 
this document also contains Conclusions and Recommendations that 
are particularised for each of the complainants, with a separate number 
(symbol) for each individual complainant.220
An example of consolidation through the issuance of a single panel report 
is found in Canada-Wheat Exports and Grain Imports. In that case, the DSB 
successively had established two panels to resolve the dispute (the “March 
Panel” and the “July Panel”). In response to a question posed by the panel, 
the parties indicated that they did not wish the two panels to issue separate 
reports in separate documents. The two panels saw no compelling reason to 
proceed differently and, therefore, decided to issue their separate reports in the 
form of a single document.221 The Canada-Wheat Exports and Grain Imports 
219 Id. para. 7.58. 
220 See Panel Report, U.S.-Steel Safeguards, para. 7.725.
221 See Panel Report, Canada-Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, paras. 6.1–6.2.
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case is interesting as it shows that consolidation may sometimes result from 
two requests for establishment of panels by the same state. In a preliminary 
ruling, the fi rst panel found that certain portions of the United States’ panel 
request that dealt with a GATT 1994 claim failed to satisfy the requirements 
of the DSU insofar as they did not identify the specifi c measures at issue.222 In 
response to this preliminary ruling, the United States asked for the suspension 
of the panel’s work. During that suspension, the United States fi led a second 
request for the establishment of a panel remedying the insuffi ciencies of its fi rst 
request with respect to its claims. The DSB established a second panel to resolve 
the dispute. Both panels had the same panellists, and two separate reports were 
issued in the form of a single document. 
6.3.3 Consolidation of procedures, effective functioning of the dispute 
settlement mechanism, and the principle of due process
The consolidation procedure established by Article 9 of the DSU is linked 
to Article 3.3 of the DSU.223 Indeed, Article 3.3 of the DSU recognizes the 
importance of avoiding unnecessary delays in the dispute settlement process 
and states that the prompt settlement of a dispute is essential to the effective 
functioning of the WTO. On the basis of the ratio legis of Article 3.3 of the 
DSU, the Appellate Body has acknowledged that consolidation, by granting 
access to a common pool of information, enables panels and parties to a 
dispute to save time by avoiding duplication of the compilation and analysis 
of information already presented in another proceeding. For instance, in the 
Hormones case—which is closer to an example of de facto consolidation—due 
to the interactive use of the scientifi c information provided both by the United 
States and Canada, the Panel managed to fi nish both panel reports at the same 
time, despite the fact that the Canadian proceeding was initiated several months 
after that of the United States.
The consolidation procedure at the WTO has been developed by the 
interpretations of the panels and the Appellate Body. The practice of these 
dispute settlement bodies is also directed towards a proper application of the 
principle of due process. In this regard, Article 9.2 focuses on the necessity for 
a panel to organize consolidated procedures in such a manner that the rights 
222 Id. para. 6.10.
223 Article 3.3 of the DSU reads as follows: 
The prompt settlement of situations in which a Member considers that any benefi ts accruing 
to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are being impaired by measures 
taken by another Member is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO and the 
maintenance of a proper balance between the rights and obligations of Members.
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that the parties to the dispute would have enjoyed had separate panels examined 
the complaints, are in no way “impaired.” The WTO panels consider that 
Article 9.2 confers upon them a broad “margin of discretion.”224 To limit such a 
discretionary power, the Appellate Body has ruled that parties to a dispute must 
make a precise “claim of prejudice.”225 
6.3.4 Consolidation and third parties
It should be noted that issues of third-party rights are not addressed by 
Article 9 of the DSU, but rather by Article 10 of the DSU, and do not deal 
directly with the consolidation of cases.226 Complainant and respondent 
states are the main parties to disputes in the WTO. Third parties also have an 
opportunity to be heard by panels and to make written submissions, provided 
that they have a substantial interest in the matter before the panel and that they 
have notifi ed their interest to the DSB. If a third party considers that a measure 
that is already the subject of a panel nullifi es or impairs benefi ts accruing to it 
under any WTO agreement, it may make its own request for the establishment 
of a panel. According to Article 10.4 of the DSU, the original panel will be 
assigned the new dispute “wherever possible.” In this context, Article 10.4 may 
be seen as an indirect means of consolidating procedures. 
6.4 Final remarks on the practice of the ICJ, the ITLOS and the WTO 
In the three dispute settlement contexts, there are legal rules that provide 
for consolidation. All three organizations have made use of them and developed 
their own practices. In the case of the ICJ and the ITLOS, consolidation relies 
on the discretion of the Court and the Tribunal. However, in practice, both 
judicial bodies have given due consideration to the wishes of the parties.227 
In the case of the WTO, the power to decide whether to establish a 
“consolidated” panel rests on the DSB. There is an elaborate provision on 
224 See Panel Report, U.S.-Steel Safeguards, paras. 10.725–10.726.
225 See Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, para. 152. 
226 See U.S.-1916 Act, para. 144, where the Appellate Body stated: 
Although the European Communities and Japan invoke Article 9 of the DSU, and, in 
particular, Article 9.3, in support of their position, we note that Article 9 of the DSU, which 
concerns procedures for multiple complaints related to the same matter, does not address the 
issue of the rights of third parties in such procedures.
227 See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 177:
In reaching this decision, the Court took into account the fact that while the basic legal 
issues in each case appeared to be identical, there were differences between the positions of 
the two Applicants, and between their respective submissions, and that joinder would be 
contrary to the wishes of the two Applicants. The Court decided to hold the public hearings 
in the two cases immediately following each other.
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consolidation in the DSU, but most of the practice regarding this issue has 
been developed by the panels and the Appellate Body. Consolidated procedures 
have even been seen as the best means of allowing for the exercise of “judicial 
economy.”228 The practice developed by the panels and the Appellate Body gives 
signifi cant importance to the principle of due process through the preservation 
of parties’ rights and obligations in cases involving multiple complaints. In this 
context, when assessing whether to consolidate cases, it is crucial to identify 
clearly the specifi c measures and the legal basis claimed by each complainant. 
Consolidation requires that a balance be found between the risk of unnecessary 
re-litigation of cases dealing with the same matter and the risk of a denial of 
justice by depriving a complaining state of its right to a panel under the DSU. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Today’s international dispute settlement scene is characterized by the 
proliferation of international courts and tribunals,229 as well as a rising number 
of related proceedings (be it only because they raise the same recurrent issue). At 
the same time, the international legal order lacks a structural harmonizing device. 
Consolidation is not a panacea to the poor level of jurisdictional coordination. 
It can play a role, however, as a “fragmentation avoidance technique.” Assuming 
the appropriate rules are set, it can prevent or reduce “intra-fragmentation” 
by joining disputes arising in the same dispute settlement forum or under the 
same institutional rules. Subject to major reforms, it is, however, unlikely to 
reduce “inter-fragmentation” resulting from related disputes being submitted 
to different dispute settlement mechanisms. 
This report discusses the pros and cons of consolidation and the practicalities 
of its implementation. It shows that consolidation may be a good device to 
increase the effi ciency and consistency of international adjudication. It also 
shows that these goals only can be met if the consolidation regime is well 
designed and suffi ciently fl exible. It fi nally shows that the experiences of other 
dispute settlement systems may provide inspiration for the development of a 
consolidation regime in investment arbitration, but not without adaptations to 
account for the specifi cities of investment treaty disputes.
228 See Panel Report, India-Autos, para. 7.214.
229 See among other writings, T. Buergenthal, The Proliferation of Disputes, Dispute Settlement 
Procedures and Respect for the Rule of Law, published in this issue of the ICSID Review—Foreign 
Investment Law Journal. W. Ben Hamida, supra note 49, p. 16; O. Delas/R. Côté/F. Crepeau/ P. Leuprecht 
(eds.), Les juridictions internationales: complémentarité ou concurrence (2005)
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In the context of the implementation of consolidation, there essentially are 
two considerations to be borne in mind: consent and due process. The power 
to consolidate cases intrinsically is linked to the issue of the jurisdiction and 
competence of international tribunals. In this context, consolidation cannot 
be envisaged in isolation of the general principles applicable to international 
adjudication, one of which is the principle of consent. Thus, in all international 
dispute settlement fora, consolidation must be guided by the principle of the 
parties’ consent. In investment arbitration, unless the parties give an ad hoc 
consent to consolidation, their consent will be implied in the acceptance that 
the arbitration would be governed by rules that provide for consolidation. The 
consolidation rules may be contained in the treaty itself, in the set of relevant 
arbitration rules, or in any other text applicable to the arbitration. Specifi cally, 
the State will give its consent by making a binding offer in the treaty to submit 
to arbitration under such rules, and the investor will consent when it accepts 
the offer by fi ling an arbitration under the relevant rules. The requirement 
of consent also means that, even where a court or a tribunal is exercising its 
“discretionary authority” to consolidate procedures (so for instance the action 
proprio motu in the ICJ and ITLOS), it should give attention to the wishes of 
the parties. 
Due consideration also should be given to the principle of due process. 
As this report has shown, due process plays a role at two different stages of 
consolidation. First, it is one of the main tests when deciding whether 
to consolidate or not. Second, it plays a major part in the conduct of the 
consolidated proceedings. Obviously, fundamental principles of due process 
govern every adjudicatory process, regardless of consolidation. This being so, 
the risk of breach is heightened in cases involving multiple claimants with 
different complaints. Thus, arbitrators should be cautious when conducting 
consolidated proceedings not to fall into the “trap” of homogenization, which 
would consist of considering that all the claims are identical. Depending on the 
circumstances, they also may have to ascertain whether the confi dentiality of 
privileged information is being protected. 
In summary, the decision to consolidate as well as the consolidated 
proceedings must be compatible with the human right to a fair trial. A fair 
trial implies the right of each claimant to have his or her claims properly 
addressed and adjudicated. The authors hope that this fi nal report stimulates 
the continuation of the debate started at the colloquium and possibly opens the 
way for the development of a consolidation regime in investment arbitration. 
But that is a project for another day.
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ANNEXES
The annexes reproduced here represent a very limited selection of relevant 
texts on consolidation. Many others are referred to in the report. Texts of BITs 
and FTAs can in particular be found at <http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/
Page____1006.aspx>; and <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/investmenttreaties.htm>.
NAFTA 
Article 1126: Consolidation 
1. A Tribunal established under this Article shall be established under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and shall conduct its proceedings in accordance 
with those Rules, except as modifi ed by this Section. 
2. Where a Tribunal established under this Article is satisfi ed that claims 
have been submitted to arbitration under Article 1120 that have a question of 
law or fact in common, the Tribunal may, in the interests of fair and effi cient 
resolution of the claims, and after hearing the disputing parties, by order: 
(a) assume jurisdiction over, and hear and determine together, all or 
part of the claims; or 
(b) assume jurisdiction over, and hear and determine one or more of 
the claims, the determination of which it believes would assist in the 
resolution of the others. 
3. A disputing party that seeks an order under paragraph 2 shall request the 
Secretary-General to establish a Tribunal and shall specify in the request: 
(a) the name of the disputing Party or disputing investors against which 
the order is sought; 
(b) the nature of the order sought; and 
(c) the grounds on which the order is sought. 
4. The disputing party shall deliver to the disputing Party or disputing 
investors against which the order is sought a copy of the request. 
5. Within 60 days of receipt of the request, the Secretary-General shall 
establish a Tribunal comprising three arbitrators. The Secretary-General shall 
appoint the presiding arbitrator from the roster referred to in Article 1124(4). 
In the event that no such presiding arbitrator is available to serve, the Secretary-
General shall appoint, from the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators, a presiding 
arbitrator who is not a national of any of the Parties. The Secretary-General 
shall appoint the two other members from the roster referred to in Article 
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1124(4), and to the extent not available from that roster, from the ICSID Panel 
of Arbitrators, and to the extent not available from that Panel, in the discretion 
of the Secretary-General. One member shall be a national of the disputing Party 
and one member shall be a national of a Party of the disputing investors. 
6. Where a Tribunal has been established under this Article, a disputing 
investor that has submitted a claim to arbitration under Article 1116 or 1117 
and that has not been named in a request made under paragraph 3 may make 
a written request to the Tribunal that it be included in an order made under 
paragraph 2, and shall specify in the request: 
(a) the name and address of the disputing investor; 
(b) the nature of the order sought; and 
(c) the grounds on which the order is sought. 
7. A disputing investor referred to in paragraph 6 shall deliver a copy of its 
request to the disputing parties named in a request made under paragraph 3. 
8. A Tribunal established under Article 1120 shall not have jurisdiction to 
decide a claim, or a part of a claim, over which a Tribunal established under this 
Article has assumed jurisdiction. 
9. On application of a disputing party, a Tribunal established under this 
Article, pending its decision under paragraph 2, may order that the proceedings 
of a Tribunal established under Article 1120 be stayed, unless the latter Tribunal 
has already adjourned its proceedings. 
10. A disputing Party shall deliver to the Secretariat, within 15 days of receipt 
by the disputing Party, a copy of: 
(a) a request for arbitration made under paragraph (1) of Article 36 of 
the ICSID Convention; 
(b) a notice of arbitration made under Article 2 of Schedule C of the 
ICSID Additional Facility Rules; or 
(c) a notice of arbitration given under the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules. 
11. A disputing Party shall deliver to the Secretariat a copy of a request made 
under paragraph 3: 
(a) within 15 days of receipt of the request, in the case of a request made 
by a disputing investor; 
(b) within 15 days of making the request, in the case of a request made 
by the disputing Party. 
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12. A disputing Party shall deliver to the Secretariat a copy of a request made 
under paragraph 6 within 15 days of receipt of the request. 
13. The Secretariat shall maintain a public register of the documents referred 
to in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12. 
U.S. Model BIT (2004) 
Article 33: Consolidation 
1. Where two or more claims have been submitted separately to arbitration 
under Article 24(1) and the claims have a question of law or fact in common and 
arise out of the same events or circumstances, any disputing party may seek a 
consolidation order in accordance with the agreement of all the disputing parties 
sought to be covered by the order or the terms of paragraphs 2 through 10. 
2. A disputing party that seeks a consolidation order under this Article shall 
deliver, in writing, a request to the Secretary-General and to all the disputing 
parties sought to be covered by the order and shall specify in the request: 
(a) the names and addresses of all the disputing parties sought to be 
covered by the order; 
(b) the nature of the order sought; and 
(c) the grounds on which the order is sought. 
3. Unless the Secretary-General fi nds within 30 days after receiving a request 
under paragraph 2 that the request is manifestly unfounded, a tribunal shall be 
established under this Article. 
4. Unless all the disputing parties sought to be covered by the order otherwise 
agree, a tribunal established under this Article shall comprise three arbitrators: 
(a) one arbitrator appointed by agreement of the claimants; 
(b) one arbitrator appointed by the respondent; and 
(c) the presiding arbitrator appointed by the Secretary-General, 
provided, however, that the presiding arbitrator shall not be a 
national of either Party. 
5. If, within 60 days after the Secretary-General receives a request made under 
paragraph 2, the respondent fails or the claimants fail to appoint an arbitrator 
in accordance with paragraph 4, the Secretary-General, on the request of any 
disputing party sought to be covered by the order, shall appoint the arbitrator 
or arbitrators not yet appointed. If the respondent fails to appoint an arbitrator, 
the Secretary-General shall appoint a national of the disputing Party, and if the 
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claimants fail to appoint an arbitrator, the Secretary-General shall appoint a 
national of the non-disputing Party. 
6. Where a tribunal established under this Article is satisfi ed that two 
or more claims that have been submitted to arbitration under Article 24(1) 
have a question of law or fact in common, and arise out of the same events or 
circumstances, the tribunal may, in the interest of fair and effi cient resolution 
of the claims, and after hearing the disputing parties, by order:
(a) assume jurisdiction over, and hear and determine together, all or 
part of the claims; 
(b) assume jurisdiction over, and hear and determine one or more of 
the claims, the determination of which it believes would assist in the 
resolution of the others; or 
(c) instruct a tribunal previously established under Article 27 [Selection 
of Arbitrators] to assume jurisdiction over, and hear and determine 
together, all or part of the claims, provided that 
(i) that tribunal, at the request of any claimant not previously a 
disputing party before that tribunal, shall be reconstituted with 
its original members, except that the arbitrator for the claimants 
shall be appointed pursuant to paragraphs 4(a) and 5; and 
(ii) that tribunal shall decide whether any prior hearing shall be 
repeated. 
7. Where a tribunal has been established under this Article, a claimant that 
has submitted a claim to arbitration under Article 24(1) and that has not been 
named in a request made under paragraph 2 may make a written request to the 
tribunal that it be included in any order made under paragraph 6, and shall 
specify in the request: 
(a) the name and address of the claimant; 
(b) the nature of the order sought; and 
(c) the grounds on which the order is sought. 
The claimant shall deliver a copy of its request to the Secretary-General. 
8. A tribunal established under this Article shall conduct its proceedings in 
accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, except as modifi ed by this 
Section. 
9. A tribunal established under Article 27 [Selection of Arbitrators] shall not 
have jurisdiction to decide a claim, or a part of a claim, over which a tribunal 
established or instructed under this Article has assumed jurisdiction. 
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10. On application of a disputing party, a tribunal established under this 
Article, pending its decision under paragraph 6, may order that the proceedings 
of a tribunal established under Article 27 [Selection of Arbitrators] be stayed, 
unless the latter tribunal has already adjourned its proceedings. 
IISD Model Agreement 
Annex A
Article 12: Consolidation
(1) Where two or more claims have been submitted separately to arbitration 
under this Agreement and the claims have a question of law or fact in common 
and arise out of the same events or circumstances, any disputing party may seek 
a consolidation order.
(2) A disputing party that seeks a consolidation order under this Article shall 
deliver, in writing, a request to the Director and to all the disputing parties 
sought to be covered by the order and shall specify in the request:
a) the names and addresses of all the disputing parties sought to be 
covered by the order;
b) the nature of the order sought; and
c) the grounds on which the order is sought.
(3) Unless the Director fi nds within 30 days after receiving a request under 
Paragraph (2) that the request is manifestly unfounded, a separate tribunal shall 
be established under this Article by the Director solely to consider the issue of 
consolidation.
(4) Where a tribunal established under this Article is satisfi ed that two or 
more claims that have been submitted to arbitration have a question of law 
or fact in common, and arise out of the same events or circumstances, the 
tribunal may, in the interest of fair and effi cient resolution of the claims, and 
after hearing the disputing parties, by order:
a) assume jurisdiction over, and hear and determine together, all or 
part of the claims;
b) assume jurisdiction over, and hear and determine one or more of 
the claims, the determination of which it believes would assist in the 
resolution of the others; or
c) instruct a tribunal previously established to assume jurisdiction over, 
and hear and determine together, all or part of the claims, provided 
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that that tribunal shall decide whether any prior hearing shall be 
repeated.
(5) Where a tribunal has been established under this Article, a claimant that 
has submitted a claim to arbitration and that has not been named in a request 
made under Paragraph (2) may make a written request to the tribunal that it 
be included in any order made under Paragraph (4), and shall specify in the 
request:
a) the name and address of the claimant;
b) the nature of the order sought; and
c) the grounds on which the order is sought.
(6) On application of a disputing party, a tribunal established under this 
Article, pending its decision under Paragraph (4), may order that the proceedings 
of another tribunal be stayed, unless the latter tribunal has already adjourned its 
proceedings.
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